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MANDAMUS AND CERTIORARI IN NEW YORK
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 1880: A
CHAPTER IN LEGAL HISTORYT
HAROLD WEINTRAUB*

THE

first constitution of the State of New York, adopted on April 20,
1777, continued the common law and the statute law of England as
the law of the State, together with the laws enacted by the legislature
of the colony.1 It was a hastily drawn document, drafted by a handful
of men in the midst of war, while New York itself was largely occupied
by the enemy. This first organic document was short and it wisely continued the laws and practices familiar to the people. It sufficed for the
needs of the new State until 1821.2
The highest court of the State was designated as the court for the
trial of impeachments and the correction of errors. It consisted of the
chancellor, the judges of the supreme court, the president of the senate
and the senators, subsequently comprising more than thirty judges? Such
numbers were obviously unwieldy for the almost insuperable task of
molding and establishing law for the newly created state; a task of similar
difficult proportions was handled with consummate skill by John Marshall
and his brethren in the federal sphere. The composition of the court of
errors was also unsuitable because the senators, drawn from varying
vocations, were unequipped with legal knowledge and training to cope
with the problems presented and provide cohesive judicial leadership
in the task of formulating decisions on appeal from the obviously more
competent supreme court. The court of errors was continued in the
1821 constitution4 but abolished in the 1846 constitution.' Only a handful
of decisions were issued in the first years of its existence and there was
no greater anachronism in the separation of powers concept adopted by
'

This paper is a revised part of a study entitled Development of Judicial Review of

Administrative Action in New York, submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science at New York University School of Law.
The guidance of Professor Bernard Schwartz is gratefully acknowledged.
Other chapters of the study have been published: Statutory Procedures Governing Judicial Review of Administrative Action, in 38 St. John's L. Rev. 86 (1963), and English
Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and Mandamus, in 9 N.Y.L.F.
478 (1963).
* Member of the New York Bar.
1. N.Y. Const. art, XXV (1777).
2. 1 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 471, 590 (1906).
3. N.Y. Const. art. XXXII (1777).
4. N.Y. Const. art. V, § 1 (1821).
5. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 1 (1846).
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the American states and the federal government than the New York
Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors.
This left the state supreme court, consisting at first of three judges,
whose members also rode circuit throughout the state, to carry almost
the entire burden of disposing of major litigation and settling fine points
of law and practice via its original and appellate jurisdiction, which the
1777 constitution continued without elaboration at all.7 The court had
been established first as the Supreme Court of Judicature for the New
York Colony in 1691 and was given a jurisdiction corresponding to that
exercised by the courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer
in England. It had express power to remove "by warrant, writ of error
or certiorari of judgments, indictments or informations from common
pleas or sessions there had or depending, and . . .to correct errors in
judgment or to reverse the same."' The first New York State courts were
perforce formed in the image of the courts in England, most of which
had been in operation here in actual name or counterpart, e.g., common
pleas, oyer and terminer, quarter sessions, special sessions, chancery,
justices of the peace.'
The first constitution having continued all of these courts, sub silentio,
the supreme court inherited the broad jurisdiction of the chief English
courts to supervise the lower courts of the state. However, the beginnings
in New York were somewhat like the uncertain start experienced by the
United States Supreme Court. There were no opinions published by Chief
Justice Jay, Chancellor Livingston or Chancellor Lansing. An official
reporter to collect and publish decisions was not authorized to act until
1804 when William Johnson commenced reporting the decisions of the
supreme court, mainly those of James Kent.
It was Kent who noted that the progress of jurisprudence in the new
State prior to 1798 was negligible. The very law of the State was not
generally known or established because there were no native precedents
for the guidance of the judges.' ° The English texts and decisions were
slavishly followed insofar as they could be adapted to local conditions.
Kent, by dint of his close study of the English law reports and treatises,
became the leading jurist of the New York bar." In time this led to his
6. Increased to four in 1791 and to five in 1794. By the 1821 constitution, it was
reduced to three again. N.Y. Const. art. V, § 4 (1821).
7. 1 Lincoln, op. cit. supra note 2, at 462.
8. Goebel, Jr., The Courts and the Law in Colonial New York, in 3 History of the
State of New York 22 (Flick ed. 1933).
9. 1 Lincoln, op. cit. supra note 2, at 674; Pound, Organization of Courts 91 (1940).
10. Dillon, Chancellor Kent, 111 American Law. 109, 110 (1903).
11. W. Kent, Memoirs and Letters of James Kent 58, 112, 117, 290 (1898). See also
Horton, James Kent, A Study in Conservatism 35, 47, 147-54 (1939).
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elevation as justice of the supreme court, chief justice of the supreme
court, and finally to chancellor.'-' By virtue of his extended, eminent
judicial services to the State in its infancy, Kent left the strong impress
of his legal conceptions upon the judicature of New York. It tended, in
the main, to be logical, learned but conservative.
PART ONE: MANDAMUS
I. BEGINNINGS
At the virtual beginning of recorded decisions in the state, 1799,
Supreme Court Justice Kent, in People v. Sessions of Chenango,'3 laid
down the broad sweep of power which his court would exercise in maintaining tfaditional supervision of the lesser courts and tribunals:
All courts within the several counties have, from the first foundation of our judicial
system, been regarded by law and by practice as inferior courts; they can be compelled to duty by mandamus; they can be restrained from usurpation by prohibition.
The causes and pleas before them, can be arrested and removed by habeas corpus or
certiorari . . .4

Justice Kent was obviously a close student of the alterations effected
in the English prerogative law of the eighteenth century, for it was during that period that the Court of King's Bench arrogated to itself the
responsibility for supervising the inferior jurisdictions of England. Kent's
pronouncement provided an admirable starting point for this increasingly
important function of his court. 5 Although Kent's decision spoke spedfically of lower court determinations rather than those of an administrative body or officer, it was ultimately to be applied to both equally, interchangeably and indiscriminately. This was a unique and distinctive
feature of New York law for a considerable period; nonjudicial bodies
and officials were placed on the same footing as the courts insofar as the
application of mandamus and certiorari was concerned. The broad jurisdiction staked out in Sessions of Chenango was far more important than
the nature of the facts in that particular case. Justice Kent provided a
viable concept of law to govern an increasingly important area of activity
where none had existed before.
For the time being, however, mandamus was confined to less illustrious
duties in the new State. It served as an auxiliary judicial mandate mainly
to provide interlocutory assistance in a judicial establishment which
functioned with very little statutory assistance. In its inauspicious
beginnings, mandamus was utilized to compel a court to render a judg12.
13.
14.
15.

W. Kent, op. cit. supra note 11, at 157.
2 Cai. Cas. 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799) (per curiam).
Ibid.
See also Sikes v. Ranson, 6 Johns. R. 279 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
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ment,' 6 to require judges to seal a bill of exceptions, 7 and the like, all
purely ministerial actions held to be incumbent upon lower courts which
were not otherwise amenable to any other control.
8
In one early case, People v. Justices of the Delaware Common Pleas,
the supreme court considered the propriety of the removal of an attorney
from practice in the court of common pleas. Acting in its supervisory
capacity the court asserted its common-law powers and overruled the
action of common pleas because "the ground of removal was too slight
for a punishment so severe."'" This last pronouncement would seem to
have come straight out of recent experience which led to a significant
amendment to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act." The supreme court
may have been more sympathetic here than legalistic in dealing with this
mandamus application because an attorney was being deprived of the
privilege to follow his calling. The result was a legal decision which is
somewhat less than satisfactory because of the court's interference with
the discretion of the lower tribunal. At this stage in New York jurisprudence, little visitorial power was given the supreme court to review
discretion exercised by an inferior tribunal, making the Delaware Common Pleas decision a less than auspicious start in the uses of mandamus.
Where matters ministerial were concerned, no doubt existed that the
supreme court could mandate the action to be taken below or overrule
action already taken. But the power exerted by means of mandamus
in Delaware Common Pleas clearly exceeded the bounds of the court's
authority because it substituted its own judgment for that of the lower
court in a matter calling for the exercise of discretion.
The problem of discretion, the perennial battleground of administrative
law, emerged early in a mandamus taken out by a constable against adverse action by a board of supervisors in the case of People ex rel. Wilson
v. Supervisors of Albany,2 in 1815. The constable had removed paupers
to various towns and then presented a bill in the sum of $102 for audit
and payment as required by law. The board allowed him only twentyeight dollars and he brought the mandamus to compel them to allow his
account as submitted. The court, falling back upon Bacon's Abridge16. People v. Judges of Cayuga, 2 Johns. Cas. 68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1800); Haight v. Turner,
2 Johns. R. 371 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807). See also Fish v. Weatherwax, 2 Johns. Cas. 215 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1801), where the reporter provides, in addition, an excellent compendium of New
York mandamus law to about 1840.
17. People ex rel. Allaire v. Judges of West Chester, 2 Johns. Cas. 118 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1800).
18. 1 Johns. Cas. 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 182.
20. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 661.
21. 12 Johns. R. 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815).
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ment, -2 the most widely quoted text on prerogative law, and Blackstone,"
the legal bible of early American courts and lawyers, 4 resorted to the
narrow, standard definition of the function of mandamus. Actually there
was small choice in the scant legal authorities available and the paucity
of guidelines necessarily shaped the nature of the answer provided by
the court. The court stated that if a party has a legal right and no other
specific legal remedy, mandamus will be issued "to require the person or
persons to whom it is directed to do some particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and which the Court issuing it has previously determined, or, at least, supposes to be consonant to right and justice. ' 2 The court then ruled that the constable
had no right to a specific sum but must wait upon the board to receive
such amount as the supervisors in their discretion should award him.
This seemingly unjust result was justified, however, by the plausible
argument that if the court interposed its own views regarding the quantum of the allowance, the court
would be taking upon ourselves a discretion which the legislature have vested in
the supervisors; we could only command them to examine the applicant's accounts,
and in the words of the statute, allow him, for his services, such sum as they shall
judge he reasonably deserves to have; and this has been already done.201
Constrained by the historical limitations of mandamus, the supreme
court was brought to enunciate a rule of absolute discretion which is
vested in inferior tribunals and administrative officers as follows:
"Wherever a discretionary power is vested in officers, and they have
exercised that discretion, this Court ought not to interfere, because they
cannot control, and ought not to coerce that discretion.", By present standards, this view would appear to cede a considerable
area of independence to such tribunals and officers without placing corresponding safeguards about the exercise of such unrestricted power.
Although this concept was fashioned early in New York judicial history
and persisted for more than a century, it is difficult to acquiesce in such
a broad grant of unrestricted power except to note that it closely followed
the English rules for the application of mandamus, received uncritically
from the mother country and applied almost mechanically here. It occurred at a time when judicial tribunals, exercising their own discretion22.

3 Bacon, Abridgement of the Law: Mandamus (6th ed. 1793).

3 Blackstone, Commentaries *110.
24. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 287 (5th ed. 1956); Pound, The
Formative Era of American Law 9, 92, 104 (1938); Walker, American Law 3 (3d ed. 1855).
25. People ex rel. Wilson v. Supervisors of Albany, 12 Johns. R. 414, 415 (N.Y. Sup.
23.

Ct. 1815).

26. Id. at 416.
27. Ibid.
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ary powers, were equally the object of mandamus proceedings and therefore jealous of preserving those powers.
In the Wilson case, the court was content that the constable had been
allowed to submit his account to the supervisors. It ruled that he had
no ((precise" legal right to anything more even though the allowance
granted by the supervisors might, in the light of the insignificant sum
awarded, be the equivalent of no allowance. Of greatest importance,
however, was the failure to insist upon some explanation or justification
for the reduction of the amount claimed. As a result, this amounts to
unbridled discretion and is certainly no credit to the "right and justice"2 8
to which Judge Spencer paid tribute in the opening lines of his decision.
The lofty purposes of mandamus somehow became lost amid the rigid
technicalities of a transplanted jurisprudence which was content to accept the guidance of antiquated 'English precedents. The Wilson decision
accordingly meant that the supreme court would not look at nor weigh
the facts on mandamus, and discretion, once exercised, became invulnerable to judicial scrutiny.
The rationale of the Wilson case was soon established as the governing rule for disposition of mandamus applications where the inferior
tribunal, usually a judicial body, had exercised a discretion. Varying
reasons were cited in subsequent cases, but they all added up to an
adamant refusal to open discretion up to further examination in a mandamus action, apparently the only form of review available at that time.
Writ of error could be brought only against a final judgment of a court
of record; certiorari was narrowly confined to examining the existence
of jurisdiction, but not the exercise of discretion.
Where a thirty-dollar medical bill for an operation performed upon a
pauper was thrice rejected by a board of supervisors, a doctor in 1821
brought mandamus in Hull v. Supervisors of County of Oneida,28 after
the board finally relented and allowed him five dollars. Again, the decision was placed squarely upon the ground that the supreme court was
"not to control their discretion, in judging what is a reasonable compensation for such services. ..." The court viewed its role as the rather
narrow and functional one of setting the board in motion to act upon the
doctor's claim; once it had acted, however unreasonably, there was no
revisory power left in the court. The result was no different shortly
afterwards where a constable, who had made a claim for service of subpoenas, was aggrieved at the very small allowance given him by the
supervisors.3 The charge for the service of subpoenas was not specified
28.
29.
30.
31.

Ibid.
19 Johns. R. 259 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821).
Id. at 263.
Ex parte Farrington, 2 Cow. 407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
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by statute whereas it wasstated for a summons and for warrants. The
court would not disturb the exercise of the board's discretion in awarding the constable a much lesser sum than that paid for a summons or
warrant, saying: "They have not refused to act; and the amount being
a matter of discretion, it is a subject, over which the Court has no control." 2 Mandamus was being thrust into an uneasy and untenable role
because its exemplary function had been one of compelling action
patently required by law, a concept diametrically opposed to that of
probing the exercise of discretion.
Mandamus and discretion were again aligned against each other in
a suit for slander where the plantiff's motion for a new trial was denied
by common pleas and he brought mandamus to review the denial.' To
the supreme court, "discretion" dealt with the adjustment of rights undefined by law. To allow an appeal or a review of these interstitial
matters, here a motion for a new trial, "would result in an endless conflict of opinion upon questions which must from their very nature be
finally determined by the Court below, because they cannot be reached
by the rules of law.. . ."I' This shows that by 1824, the supreme court
had already rationalized refusal to review discretionary action of inferior bodies, though it appears to be remiss in performing an essential
obligation of a higher court, viz., to clarify and establish the law for
the lesser courts. Actually, the decision is correct in strict principle, although the language is somewhat inept because lower courts must needs
resolve the myriad questions which are brought to them for their judgment. That is the function of a tribunal and that is what the supreme
court has here pleaded in avoidance. But the right to at least one appellate review of lower court decisions had not yet become established
in the new State. Consequently, many matters which impinged upon the
merits of a suit were denied higher court review by virtue of the simple
proposition that they involved matters of "discretion" which in their
nature should be resolved by the lower court. In addition, the form of
remedy employed, mandamus, was wholly unsuited to the task set for
it because its special function was solely to procure action plainly prescribed by law, i.e., action of a ministerial nature.
But as a result of these direct challenges to the immunities enjoyed
by "discretion," mandamus law was slowly launched in the direction of
placing "discretion" under some legal restraint. A small dent in the
facade came about on the strength of a rather questionable decision by
32. Id. at 408. The court rejected the opportunity to reason analogously from the rules
prescribed by statute for the payment for service of a warrant or a summons. They were
different in type but not in kind.
33. Ex parte Baily, 2 Cow. 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
34. Id. at 483.
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which a common pleas court had set aside a report of referees which had
turned on the credibility of a witness. The supreme court bluntly acknowledged that common pleas had erred in its action." The court, nevertheless, again fell back upon the meaningless formula that "wherever an
inferior jurisdiction, having a discretion, have [sic] exercised it, this Court
does not interfere by mandamus."8 0 The extreme action of the lower
court here, however, invited some remedy against future transgressions
where such patent error might arise. The court accordingly added this
warning in its decision, by way of a dictum: "We do not mean to say,
that we would not grant a mandamus in a plain case, where the evidence
is all one way, and there is nothing contradictory; where the case is so
palpable as to leave no room for discretion in the Court below." 7 The
supreme court, in this momentous language, partly redeemed its refusal
to act upon the obvious error in this particular case. The stranglehold
of absolute discretion was loosened somewhat and the portentous dictum
held promise of an alteration in the treatment of mandamus applications
involving discretion. 8
Meanwhile, other developments were simultaneously shaping the law
of mandamus in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Mandamus
had become a Jack-of-all-trades writ, widely employed either to secure
appellate review directly or in conjunction with pending review by writ
of error or bill of exceptions. Thus, in a case where common pleas had
set aside a judgment for insufficiency in the complaint, the aggrieved
party resorted to mandamus for restoration of the judgment originally
awarded. 9 The supreme court rejected the application on the ground
that the action of common pleas was reviewable by writ of error after
judgment was formally entered. The basic requirement of mandamus that
no other specific legal remedy be available before it will issue in behalf
of a party was here invoked against the plaintiff.
Closely related to availability of another legal remedy is the rule
that the supreme court will exercise its own discretion before granting
a mandamus which, unlike a writ of error, is not a writ of right. Thus,
although the supreme court in this period, the 1820's, allowed a mandamus to issue in one early case,40 it warned that discretion would guide
35.
36.

Ex parte Bassett, 2 Cow. 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
Id. at 459. (Emphasis omitted.)

37. Ibid.
38. See People ex rel. Oebricks v. Superior Court of City of New-York, 5 Wend. 114
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830), and text accompanying notes 64-69 infra.
39. Ex parte Bostwick, 1 Cow. 143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823). See also Boyce v. Russell, 2
Cow. 444 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Jansen v. Davison, 2 Johns. Cas. 72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1800);
People ex rel. Wilson v. Supervisors of Albany, 12 Johns. R. 414 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815),
and text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
40. Van Rensselaer v. Sheriff of Albany, 1 Cow. 501, 512 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
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its decision in granting or withholding the prerogative remedy, citing
Bacon's Abridgement as its authority. The court indicated that a case of
hardship attending the issuance of the writ would strongly influence its
decision in deciding whether to issue the writ. Mandamus was intended
to correct injustice and should not have the opposite effect of creating
an equal or serious injustice by reason of its issuance.
The traditional function of mandamus to compel action by a public
official in regard to a duty imposed by law became more clearly defined
as greater legal knowledge and experience were acquired in the new State.
Where a loss of land had been occasioned by diversion of water for the
newly constructed Erie Canal, the canal commissioners had refused to
act in regard to relators' claim for an appraisal of damages. The court,
in Ex parte Jennings,41 in 1826, found that the relators had demonstrated
"can interest which entities them to an appraisal; and it is for the appraisers to determine its extent, on the hearing before them." 4 - No valid
reason had been offered to excuse their failure to act. 3 Even though the
appraisers had answered that they were without jurisdiction because
the claim pertained to water rights and not land damages per se, the
court nonetheless ordered a decision to be made on the claim." In another
case involving the refusal of canal commissioners to pay a claim, the
amount of which had already been fixed by appraisal, the court termed
them a judicial body "appointed by law to act in a matter of public
concern, in the decision of controversies, or causes of a certain character
between individuals and the state." 45 Although one member of the
tripartite board had refused to participate in the decision, the court
found that the facts were not disputed, and a valid appraisal having
been made, the commissioners were accordingly ordered to pay the damages assessed."
Inextricably related to the duty of a public official to act as mandated
by law is the necessary existence of a clear legal right in the person requesting the action to be performed. This requirement differs in quality
and quantum of proof both from the standard of "preponderance of
evidence" which prevails in civil cases and from the "beyond a reason41.
42.

6 Cow. 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
Id. at 528.

43. Ibid.
44. Peremptory mandamus issued sub nom. People ex rel. Jennings v. Seymour, 6 Cow.
579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
45. Ex parte Rogers, 7 Cow. 526, 529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
46. See also People ex reL. Ainsworth v. Comptroller of State of New-York, 1 Wend. 301
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828); People ex rel. Overseers of the Poor v. Supervisors of County of
Oswego, 2 Wend. 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829); People ex rel. Dobbs v. Dean, 3 Wend. 438
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830); Harrington v. Trustees of Village of Rochester, 10 Wend. 547 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1833).
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able doubt" requirement necessary for conviction of a crime. The difference, it would appear, is that the mandamus requirement is more stringent than either and denotes an absolute quality. The "clear legal right"
requirement was first laid down in specific terms in People v. Supervisors
of County of Columbia.4 7 Although this doctrine would appear to be
correlative to the duty of a public official to act in certain premises, it
more frequently was cited in conjunction with judicial utterances that
no other legal remedy exist before a mandamus will issue. 4 There is
no organic relationship between the two requirements and their joint
association must be attributed to mere judicial happenstance. The first
intimation of the "clear legal right" rule showed, however, no dependency upon the "absence of another legal remedy" requirement. 4 That
requirement Was clarified about this time to mean that having recourse
to equity or criminal proceedings did not constitute the full and sufficient
remedy which the law contemplated as a legal remedy to oust mandamus.5 o
Earlier the supreme court, having grown impatient with the heavy
demands placed upon its time by the trivial and interlocutory matters
brought to it by mandamus, 51 issued notice that such liberties would be
tolerated no longer. 2 The flow of inconsequential motions in the guise
of writs of mandamus did not abate sufficiently with the first warning
because the supreme court was again required to put up a halting
hand.53
The prevailing wide use of the writ was a testimonial of its value and
utility and it was soon deemed important enough to warrant extended
consideration by the highest court of the state, the court of errors, in
Commercial Bank v. Canal Comm'rs. 4 The decision by Chancellor
Walworth is a useful guide to the mandamus practice of the period. It
47.

10 Wend. 363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).

48. Id. at 367; People ex rel. Dikeman v. President of Village of Brooklyn, 1 Wend,
318 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1828).
49. Commercial Bank v. Canal Comm'rs, 10 Wend. 25, 33 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1832).
50.

People ex rel. Moulton v. Mayor of New York, 10 Wend. 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).

51. See, e.g., Ex parte Kellogg, 3 Cow. 372 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Ex parte Clarke, 3
Cow. 379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Ex parte Stone, 3 Cow. 380 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824); Ex
parte Chambrelain, 4 Cow. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825); Ex parte Shethar, 4 Cow. 540 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1825); Ex parte Sanders, 4 Cow. 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825); People ex rel. McCall v.
Irving, 1 Wend. 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828); People ex rel. Fay v. Judges of Oneida Common
Pleas, 1 Wend. 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828); People ex rel. Spencer v. judges of Monroe
Common Pleas, 1 Wend. 29 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).

52.

Ex parte Coster, 7 Cow. 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).

53.

Anon., 9 Wend. 472 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833)

54.

10 Wend. 25 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1832).
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was later largely codified into the Code of Civil Procedure of 1880W'
The purpose of proceeding by alternative mandamus to elicit the full
facts of a case was clarified; a defendant could move against a defective
writ without the necessity of first making a return; the regular rules of
pleading were noted as being applicable to a mandamus action. This
simple, concise summary of mandamus practice made clear the function
it was primarily intended to serve at this point in New York legal history,
viz., solely to direct the performance of ministerial action. It showed
also that although widely employed, the full extent of mandamus practice
was not then sufficiently understood and needed the careful explanation
which was elaborated in the Commercial Bank opinion.
II.

REvIEw OF DISCRETION

Altough some small steps had been taken to mitigate the rigors of
unlimited discretion, albeit only in respect to an inferior judicial tribunal,56 that citadel of immunity from judicial review remained largely
untouched by the forward progress achieved in other branches of mandamus law. The venerable legal technique of distinguishing and thereby
cutting off areas from the application of the rule of absolute discretion
proved to be the only method whereby this entrenched principle was
constricted, year by year.
For example, the Common Council of the City of Albany had appropriated certain sums for specific purposes for the ensuing year and
by law the Board of Supervisors of Albany County was required to assess and cause to be raised by taxes the sums so appropriated. The
supervisors demurred, claiming to have a discretion in the matter and
adding that an unused balance from the prior year was available, whereupon the council went to the supreme court for a mandamus against the
board. In Ex parte Common Council of Albany,"T in 1824, the court had
the delicate task of balancing the clear power of the council to appropriate the funds against the claimed discretion of the supervisors to lay
and collect taxes according to their own dictates. Although the latter
body acted largely in a legislative capacity, which would normally be
immune from judicial interdiction, the court found that the law in this
case confided no choice to the supervisors. "The statute is imperative
upon the supervisors."" It thereby extracted all discretion from the
exercise of their power in acting upon the appropriation made by the
council. The court, without stating so specifically, perceived that the
55. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1880, ch. 178, Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 16, tit. 2, art. 4
(Mandamus).
56. Ex parte Bassett, 2 Cow. 458 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
57. 3 Cow. 358 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1824).
58. Id. at 365.
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supervisors functioned in several roles and that in regard to the appropriation made by the council they served only in a ministerial capacity, leaving no room for the exercise of discretion. The case is not unlike recent litigation involving the City of New York where it was held
that the City retained no discretion but to appropriate funds for salaries
fixed for employees of state courts situated within the city.59 The Common Council of Albany case did not reject the rule of discretion in the
proper place and under the proper circumstances. It merely put the rule
aside as inapplicable to the facts of that case, which nonetheless placed
another question mark upon the banner of absolute discretion.
In another case where the rule of discretion was theoretically upheld,
its omnipotence was further downgraded by the supreme court in an
unusual manner." ° Common pleas had set aside a default in an.action
and the relators now moved to vacate that order. The supreme court,
alluding to the broad rule of discretion which applied to such a situation,
repeated the dictum of an earlier case that the exercise of power to
vacate is not governed by fixed principles-doubtlessly meaning that
the discretion of common pleas must be left unfettered in order to deal
with the illimitable combinations of circumstances which could arise in
particular cases. However, a small warning signal was raised in this
free-wheeling area of discretion, the court noting that "no positive rule
of law has been violated by the court below," 61 thereby placing another
damper upon the unrestricted exercise of so-called discretion. It could be
deduced that such discretion was about to be measured by legality and
that the mere power to exercise discretion would not always sweep all
before it. The relators were defeated here, but the shape of merely
ministerial mandamus gained a new dimension in the caveat dropped
by the court.
Two years later, in 1828, a mandamus case touching the exercise of
discretion again resulted in a setback for the relators but it also brought
such discretion nearer to judicial supervision. Common pleas, on a
motion for a new trial, had refused to consider affidavits from jurors impeaching their own verdict. The supreme court, in People ex rel. Hosmer
v. Columbia Common Pleas,"2 stated the general rule that it would not
coerce or control the discretion of a subordinate tribunal by mandamus.
However, where such tribunals "have erred in the application of legal
principles to the cases before them, the court will apply the proper
remedy."6 " This edict is but a different way of saying that the discretion
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Wingate v. McGoldrick, 279 N.Y. 246, 18 N.E.2d 143 (1938).
Ex parte Bacon, 6 Cow. 392 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826).
Id. at 393.
1 Wend. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
Id. at 299.
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to be exercised by subordinate tribunals is, in contemplation of law, a
discretion governed by legal principles. Although the quoted language
was but a dictum and the decision to affirm the action of common pleas
and deny the mandamus rested on other grounds, their purport reached
the mark because the dictum shortly became the rule.
The actual change was engineered in another mandamus-type appeal
from a lower court decision which again turned on established legal
principles. In People ex rel. Oebricks v. Superior Court of City of New
York,64 in 1830, the lower court had granted defendant's motion for a
new trial and plaintiff brought mandamus against the lower tribunal to
vacate the rule granting a new trial. The supreme court enumerated all
the requirements for granting a new trial, much as they exist now. It
plainly appeared that there had been an insufficient basis for granting
the motion and that defendant court had fallen back upon its power of
discretion in deciding motions for new trials. The supreme court proceeded to pay great deference to the discretion confided to inferior tribunals, especially where the problem "cannot be governed by any fixed
principles or rules."65 It even cited those cases where the exercise of discretion by administrative bodies had been upheld. The court recognized
that "it is their judgment and discretion, and not ours to which the
legislature have left the decision of that matter."6 This remark reaches
to the very heart of the problem.
The court noted, however, that the powers of these tribunals and
officials were legal powers derived from law. It implied that they were
therefore subject to the scrutiny of a higher court which must determine
whether those powers had been exercised pursuant to law. The issue of
discretion is thus squarely presented within a framework of power subject ultimately to law. The respective spheres of law, power and discretion are divided and allocated, but without mathematical precision
because we know that the subject does not lend itself to such precision.
Although the determination under consideration had been made by a
judicial tribunal, the supreme court used examples of discretion by administrative bodies, officials and judicial tribunals interchangeably without differentiation. This treatment makes it evident that much of the
law which governs mandamus in regard to administrative bodies
emanated primarily, as the foregoing cases demonstrate, from experience
originating with inferior judicial tribunals. Consequently, the prior
tendency of the supreme court to follow a hands-off policy is fully understandable, even if debatable, because it failed to distinguish the respec64. 5 Wend. 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
65. Id. at 125.
66. Ibid.
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tive responsibilities, traditions and powers of a court from those of an
official or an official body.
However, the supreme court did not leave off with the bare generalization that in the course of the exercise of powers by inferior bodies and
officials questions of law which arise were to be ultimately decided by
the supreme court. The development of law from a particular case to a
general rule was carefully traced by the court, and once a rule for a
certain set of facts was established, the body, judicial or administrative,
"would have parted with their discretion, and substituted in its place a
clear and well defined rule .... ,"67 The rule of discretion, by an accretion of experience and precedent, in time becomes the rule of law. Although it is difficult to define a standard for the weighing of conflicting
evidence, the court in this case saw that there was no problem "where
the evidence is all upon one side, and clear and satisfactory, [in which
case] it ceases to be a matter of discretion." 68 Therefore, when we speak
of the court's discretion in regard to such a situation, it is a 0"sound
'
legal discretion," of which it cannot be said that it is "arbitrary."
In one fell swoop, the supreme court discarded the tottering rule of
absolute discretion which had theretofore controlled its decisions on
mandamus to inferior tribunals and officials. Thereafter, if the decision
just made was followed, the legal discretion test would be applied so
that the area of undefined discretion would be progressively narrowed
by establishment and application of prior experience and precedents under the liberal principles enunciated by the court."0 In a later decision,
upon granting a peremptory mandamus in this case, the court repeated
its precept that the discretion to be exercised must be a legal and not
an arbitrary discretion, making such action henceforth subject to review
by the supreme court. 7
The movement to place some control upon the theretofore unbridled
discretion of inferior tribunals and officials by means of mandamus was,
however, short-lived. The court of errors, stepping into the picture at
the first opportunity, completely nullified the Superior Court of City
of New York decision in the case of Judges of Oneida Common Pleas v.
People,72 in 1837. In common pleas there had been a recovery for less
than fifty dollars but the court awarded full costs on the ground that
title to land had been brought into question. Upon mandamus to the
67.

Id. at 126, cf. Larkin Co. v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 336, 151 N.E. 637, 639 (1926).

68.

5 Wend. 114, 126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).

69. Ibid.
70. Id. at 128.
71. People ex rel. Oebricks v. Superior Court of City of New York, 10 Wend. 285,
298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
72. 18 Wend. 79 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837).
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supreme court the order for full costs was vacated, that court ruling
that title to land was not litigated. The case for mere costs now reached
the highest court of the state by writ of error on the question of the
power of the supreme court to revise the decision of a lower court by
mandamus on a question of discretion, namely, award of costs.
Chancellor Walworth, speaking for reversal of the supreme court
which carried unanimously, put the issue succinctly: "[T]he mode of
proceeding by mandamus, under the present statutory provisions on the
subject, is a very inappropriate remedy to correct mere errors of judgment, either as to law or fact, in courts of general common law jurisdiction."' 3 In point of fact the Chancellor was partially correct, but
also partially in error because the statutory provisions to which he alluded consisted of a mere parcel of seven procedural sections,7 none of
which was dispositive of the questions presented either in the court of
errors or in the courts below. He was partially correct in alluding to
the mistake of using mandamus to correct errors of fact committed in
courts of general common-law jurisdiction; such was not the proper function of mandamus. By growing custom and practice those questions were
nevertheless diverted to the supreme court by means of the writ because
of the lack of adequate statutory provisions for appeal on intermediate
matters in the judicial establishment. In other words, mandamus had
been called upon to fill a hiatus in the legal system and was used in
lieu of a writ of error or what would now be called an appeal.
On questions of law not touching issues of fact, the supreme court
had met a great need by using the mandamus as an omnibus writ to
exercise a sort of appellate jurisdiction over interstitial matters not
reachable by writ of error or bill of exceptions. Chancellor Walworth
ignored these developments of everyday court life in New York of the
1820's and 1830's. He chose, instead, to enunciate and follow English
law written well over a century earlier, rather than acknowledge and
deal with widespread practices followed in the courts of his own time.
Senator Tracy delivered the other opinion of the court and he, too,
looked backwards to the earlier English cases and text writers for safe
but archaic authorities. 75 He quoted a definition derived from Coke and
Mansfield, that mandamus is concerned with "breach of the peace, disobedience of a law, or neglect of official duty"70 to indicate its proper
role as a writ. The Senator completely overlooked the genius of the common law, which in the case of mandamus had moved far beyond an arid
73. Id. at 88.
74. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 586-87, §§ 54-60 (1829).
75. 18 Wend. 79, 91-92 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837).
76. Id. at 91. See Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ:
Certiorari and Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478, 489, 499 (1963).
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definition derived from times long past; a common law which had prospered its development by filling its writs with enlarged meaning derived from contemporary needs while retaining the familiar legal forms
to enable the bench and the bar to continue to use them with understanding and ease.
He took up the decision in Superior Court of City of New York 77 and
stated that the supreme court there had improperly asserted jurisdiction
by mandamus over the judicial acts of an inferior court. His strongest
attack was directed against the concept that discretion is such a palpable
thing that it can be weighed and evaluated in objective terms. He contended that discretion means,
when applied to public functionaries, a power or right conferred upon them by law,
of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own
judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
But what is to be understood by a discretion that is governed by fixed legal prinnot found satisfactorily
ciples is, I must be allowed to say, something that I have
78
explained, and what it is not easy for me to comprehend.

As far as it goes, this is an admirable statement of the purposes and
conditions under which discretion should operate, and of the problems
encountered in attempting to place it within the bounds of an all-embracing definition. Senator Tracy also laid bare some of the problems
inherent in formulating rules to control discretion by judicial review, but
he would not recognize that questions of fact can take on the coloration
of questions of law by reason of weight or absence of evidence. He invoked the subjective concept of "conscience" which is personal and absolute to preclude the use of any objective standards for evaluating the
exercise of discretion. Senator Tracy finally betrayed his real concern in
the matter by stating that if the Superior Court of City of New York
decision were not overruled, "we should be perpetually appealed to for
the adjustment of rights undefined by law."17 The court of errors would
be "flooded with paltry questions of common pleas practice ....

,,10 Sit-

ting both as legislator and judge, he had somehow forgotten the first
purpose of a court of justice. He apparently believed that a party should
have but one adjudication and no further right to appeal "from all decisions of fact, as well as law, that are made in the inferior tribunals of
the state."'" He rather overstated the proposition regarding the narrow
scope of review on questions of fact by insisting that questions of fact
cannot be better evaluated by an appellate court at one remove from the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

5 Wend. 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
18 Wend. 79, 99 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837).
Id. at 103.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 103.
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testimony given at trial by witnesses,8 2 which actually begs the question
at issue.
In his careful opinion, Senator Tracy delivered several powerful
blows in the interest of confiding broad discretion to inferior tribunals,
primarily those judicial, and not trammelling their determinations with
second-guessing. What had apparently escaped his exhaustive study of
the problem was the paucity of appellate review then available in matters of practice and on intermediate appellate questions. This was the
need ministered to by the expanded scope of mandamus. The remedial
purposes of that writ, designed generally to correct a failure of justice,
had been enlisted in the service of meeting new legal problems, such as
providing review for arbitrary exercise of discretion. A serious drawback was that in a period of rapid change the writ functioned within the
framework of a relatively static judicial system which largely followed
the English forms and practices of a century earlier. The courts could
take their choice of legal precedent from any century they pleased and
they frequently opted for the safe certainty of the eighteenth. Although
the common-law system of jurisprudence had always sought to retain the
best of the past and meet the needs of the present by careful innovation,
early prerogative law in New York seemed unable to cope with changed
conditions. The courts looked increasingly backwards for guidance to
meet the problems of the present. The citations relied upon in mandamus
and certiorari cases, up to about a century after independence was gained
from the mother country, invariably invoked English precedents of an
earlier and different age and political society. It is interesting to note
that federal precedent attracted little or no attention of the New York

judges.8 3
Irrespective of whether Senator Tracy was right or wrong in his
animadversions on the proper limits of judicial review in the Oneida
Common Pleas decision, the inviolability of lower tribunal discretion was
thenceforth rendered immune from revision by mandamus. Discretion
was again enthroned and any action bearing the label "judicial," i.e.,
discretionary, whether by judicial tribunal or administrative body, was
thereby rendered safe from" review, revision or interference in a mandamus proceeding. For example, in the same year as the Oneida Common Pleas decision, 1837, the supreme court was asked to award a

mandamus against town highway commissioners who refused to work
82. Id. at 104-O5. See Frank, Courts on Trial (1949), for a similar thesis advanced by
Judge Jerome Frank a century later.
83. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), was more concerned with
constitutional principles than prerogative law. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524 (1838), failed to measure up to the English decisions and text writers as an authoritative
guide.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

and open a road laid out by state commissioners s4 The defendant town
commissioners claimed that the legislative directions in regard to the
location of the road had not been followed and therefore they were absolved from further action. The court was inclined to agree with this
criticism, calling the route "strikingly injudicious." However,; it found the
duty of the state commissioners to be judicial, and the injudicious was
thereby spared further scrutiny and review; the town highway commissioners were directed to work and open the road. By modern standards,
laying out a road would hardly qualify as a judicial act, but such a description was often resorted to in the last century in order to obviate
review by the supreme court.
The foregoing Collins case is particularly notable for its description
of the problem of defining discretion, the opinion stating that
there can be in the nature of things no rule by which discretion is to be precisely
measured . . . . Matter of discretion is but another name for matter of judgment,
which always makes a part of the merits in every controversy. The very act of
creating a board for determining controversies and settling rights, implies that the
legislature cannot themselves determine and settle.8 5

The most instructive part of this quotation explains that the exercise
of discretion is imbedded in the very act of deciding the merits and is
so inseparable from it that it is futile to try to isolate the one from the
other. That view may not be as valid today because findings are now
increasingly required of administrative bodies so that the intermediate
exercise of discretion in respect to relevant phases of a controversy
can be extracted and judged independently, and ultimately all must be
consistent with the final deteimination.
The quotation from the Collins case is also important for indicating
early appreciation by the legislature of the detailed responsibilities which
could be confided to administrative boards in "determining controversies
and settling rights," in those situations where the legislature believed
that traditional judicial methods could not fully cope with the nature
of the problems faced. The increased legislative reliance upon administrative bodies facilitated ultimate judicial acceptance of such modes of
procedure.
Another penetrating decision on the subject of discretion was handed
down in 1837, the same year as the two preceding cases. This involved a
judicial tribunal which had refused to enter a judgment against a relator
which he required to enable him to bring his writ of error for review of
the merits of the case. 6 On the surface, this is precisely the type of
84. People ex rel. Case v.' Collins, 19 Wend. 56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
85. Id. at 60.
86. People ex rel. Robinson v. Superior Court of City of New York, 19 Wend. 68 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1837).
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ministerial action for which mandamus had been employed to put inferior bodies into motion. However, it was found upon review that the
affidavits showed that there was a conflict in the facts. The court said in
regard to this: "On motion for a mandamus, if there appears to be a fair,
indeed I may say a plausible opening for an opposite conclusion, there
is no rule of law upon which I can say to the court below that they shall
not adopt it."8s7 This viewpoint almost parallels the position adopted by
courts today in testing the validity of administrative action involving
the exercise of discretion." It bears repetition to note that contemporary
treatment of administrative discretion on judicial review emanated from
experience drawing upon mandamus applications brought largely against
judicial and not administrative tribunals, resulting in a more narrow and
less stringent supervision by judicial review.
The argument against using mandamus to review discretion exercised
by judicial bodies was best stated in the foregoing Superior Court of
City of New York decision. Where that sphere of action is involved:
That they have acted against a strong balance of testimony is not enough. The case
should be conclusive against them in point of fact; and come to us upon a mere
point of law ....

By what rule of law am I to estimate the force or weight of

circumstances falling on the mind? The law knows no standard in such cases
beyond the mind which it has selected to weigh them. .

.

. [M]en must proceed

without scales to affix a weight by the exercise of their reason. A mandamus cannot direct the line of thought. Where the law leaves that open it is never done....
With what propriety, then, shall the law go into the region of metaphysics, and
demand that men shall agree in certain prescribed conclusions from premises demanding the exercise of human judgment? . . . [A] mandamus deals in matter of law,

as exclusively as a writ of error or certiorari.8 9

In this treatment of a difficult question which came up on review from
a judicial tribunal, but was equally applicable to the exercise of administrative discretion, there is little escape from a logic which viewed
the power to exercise discretion as irrefragable. This was especially true
where the instrumentality chosen to challenge that exercise of discretion
was the ancient writ of mandamus, which moved bodies to patent action
prescribed by law but always had held itself aloof from prescribing the
direction (i.e., discretion) which the action must take where a choice
was presented. There was abundant merit in the arguments expressed by
the court and its viewpoint is today largely followed in judicial review
of administrative determinations of fact.
The views expressed in the foregoing quotation regarding nonreviewability of judicial discretion by mandamus were later reinforced in the
87. Id. at 70.

•

88. Stracquadanio v. Department of Health, 285 N.Y. 93, 96, 32 N.E2d,806, 808 (1941).
89. 19 Wend. 68, 70-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
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case of an appeal taken to common pleas from the justice court. Common pleas had quashed the appeal because the appeal bond had misnamed the date of the judgment, an apparently harmless mistake. Relator thereupon moved by mandamus in the supreme court to have the
quashing order vacated." It must be reiterated that throughout this
period, in the absence of other legal remedial machinery, mandamus had
been extensively used to correct errors in procedural and appellate practice, errors which did not reach the merits of the case. But the judicial
die was now cast and discretion was again held invulnerable to attack, the
court ruling that
the writ of mandamus cannot be awarded for the correction of judicial errors....
Their errors, if corrected at all, must be reached by some other process than the
writ of mandamus.

It is not to be denied that there had been a gradual departure in this state from
the old law on this subject . . . . But we stand corrected by the decision of the
court of last resort in the case of The Judges of Oneida v. The People ....
[W]e
have no jurisdiction by mandamus to review the decisions of a subordinate court in
a matter of which it had judicial cognizance. 91

Thus ended a chapter of mandamus history in New York.
In fact, the pendulum now swung to the other extreme and Judge
Cowen, in subsequently commenting on the rule laid down in The Judges
of Oneida case, stated:
[W]here discretionary or judicial power has been exercised upon a matter within the
jurisdiction of the inferior court or magistrate, although in making the decision the
tribunal has mistaken either the law or the fact,
or both, . . . this court cannot
92
compel a change of determination by mandamus.

Mandamus, having served the early judicial establishment as an allpurpose writ in the absence of other statutory or judicial devices, was
now relegated to its narrow, traditional function of simply requiring that
action clearly mandated by law be followed. However, the vice of the
Fuller opinion was that lower determinations of questions of fact and
questions of law were lumped together indiscriminately under the single
heading of exercise of discretion. Accordingly, the supreme court applied a narrow rule of review, i.e., as upon the facts, to another area,
question of law, where the full competence of a court of law should have
been exerted.
90. People ex rel. Doughty v. Judges of Dutchess Common Pleas, 20 Wend. 658 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1839).
91.

Id. at 659-60.

92. People ex rel. Fuller v. Judges of Oneida Common Pleas, 21 Wend. 20, 24 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1839). See also Ex parte Hutchinson v. Commissioners of Canal Fund, 25 Wend,

692 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841); Ex parte Koon, 1 Denio 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Ex parte
Ostrander, 1 Denio 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845).
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Despite the apparent inflexibility of the rule, the plea of exercise of
discretion did not always oust the supreme court from awarding mandamus where it considered the law to be clear or the case worthy of its
intercession. Such a case occurred when the Mayor of Albany refused
to issue a license to relator to engage in the business of booking passage
for emigrants. A law had been enacted to mitigate the abuses practiced
in that activity and applicants were thenceforth required to keep a public office, submit a satisfactory bond and tender the requisite license fee,
all of which relator showed that he had done. The mayor replied that he
nevertheless retained a discretion to grant or deny the license. The court,
in People ex rel. Osterhout v. Perry, 3 observed that the legislature had
attached no further conditions to this "innovation upon the common
law" right to pursue a vocation; that a discretion in the mayor, if intended, could easily have been expressed in the statute. The court compared this case with the matter of issuing tavern licenses where the law
stipulated that applicants must be of good moral character, but it noted
that cartmen are licensed without such a restriction. 4 It determined
that in the exercise of the power thus conferred by law upon him, the
mayor had an official duty to perform if all the conditions laid down by
the legislature were met, thereby exhausting any small discretion he may
have had so far as the bond or the public office requirements were concerned. 9 5 However, the court did speculate that perhaps it would have
been better if the legislature had vested the mayor with a discretion in
the matter, because of the abuses practiced upon the "unwary foreigner,"
and no doubt the mayor was actuated by honest motives in withholding
the license. "But it is my duty, as well as his, to administer the law as
it is, and not as we may think it ought to be." '
The last statement may well serve as a standing admonition to all
public officials, judges and administrators alike, that law loses the efficacy to promote its objectives if private views or foreign considerations
are permitted to intrude. It is useful to reflect upon the quoted language
because the Osterhout situation has recurred time and again.!,
The Osterhout opinion was notable also for the extended consideration it gave to differences in contemporary licensing practices reflecting
the fact that the legislature had perceived and provided for varying
conditions by prescribing different requirements for each of them. Most
93. 13 Barb. 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852).
94. Id. at 207-08.
95. Cf. People ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. Board of Supervisors, 56 Barb. 4S2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1867).

96. 13 Barb. at 209. (Emphasis in original.)
97. Cf. Bologno v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 164 N.E.2d 389, 196 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1959);
Picone v. Commissioner of Licenses, 241 N.Y. 157, 149 N.E. 336 (1925).
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important, the court, although sympathetic to the administrator's problems, emphasized that the right to engage in an occupation cannot be
thwarted under the guise of exercising a discretion conferred by statute
where all the requirements of law have been met. In that case, the proper occasion for placing mandamus at the service of the applicant for
the license had been clearly presented, whereas the reasons for withholding the writ were less than persuasive.
In one important decision dealing with several branches of administrative law, it was ruled that with regard to the exercise of discretion by
an administrative body, the court will not inquire into their motives or
mental processes. 9s This principle has been reaffirmed recently in leading
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court 9 and the New York
Court of Appeals. 100
In the small number of instances where the court desired to award
relief upon an application for mandamus although discretion was involved, it merely affixed an appropriate label to the action involved in
order to reach the conclusion that it wished. Thus, where relator had
entered a request to have his name stricken from a list of jurors, it was
denied by the defendant jury commissioner. Special term denied relator's
mandamus application but general term reversed. It ruled that the commissioner of jurors is a ministerial officer and that:
There are many questions requiring the decision of ministerial officers which involve,
to some extent, the exercise of legal discrimination in their solution, but which are
not regarded as judicial questions, and consequently the decision of them is not
conclusive in collateral proceedings.'o'

The only real question decided by the court was that a mandamus would
lie for the purpose of challenging the jury commissioner's "legal discrimination," i.e., discretion, because he was a "ministerial officer."
Notwithstanding Taylor, subsequent decisions did not depart from the
now well-established principle that discretion would not be regulated by
the courts on an application for mandamus.'0 2 Small inroads were made
now and then upon this redoubt by intermittent decisions which would
eventually allow the courts to pronounce a rule of reasonableness to guide
the exercise of discretion where administrative action is involved. So, although a mandamus was refused against certain land office commission98. People ex rel. Thompson v. Board of Supervisors, 35 Barb. 408, 412 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1861).
99. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1937).
100. Taub v. Pirnie, 3 N.Y.2d 188, 193-94, 144 N.E.2d 3, 5, 165 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1957).
101. People ex rel. Livingston v. Taylor, 45 Barb. 129, 135-36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).
102. People ex rel. Board of Supervisors v. Commissioners of Prospect Park, 58 Barb.
638, 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870); People ex rel. Bullard v. Contracting Bd., 33 N.Y. 382
(1865); People ex rel. Belden v. Contracting Bd., 27 N.Y. 378 (1863).
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ers in regard to the funds and affairs of the New York State Inebriate
Asylum because their power was "quasi judicial," the court nevertheless
cautioned that "palpable abuse" of such power could conceivably render
it amenable to "judicial control."' 10 3
The so-called judicial discretion of a board of supervisors was placed
under attack where relator, a town highway commissioner, having submitted his bill for serving twenty-seven days at two dollars per day, was
paid only thirty-four dollars without further explanation. In affirming the
issuance of mandamus against the board, general term repeated that the
exercise of such judicial discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus.
Nevertheless, a proper and legal audit required the board to "detail and
1° An additional requisite was now
allow or disallow the various items."'perforce added to the conditions for the valid exercise of so-called judicial discretion by a basically administrative body, viz., the body must
make specific findings just as judicial tribunals do. It would be fair to
assume that this duty of specification was ordered to enable a court to
decide later whether the board had exercised its discretion reasonably.
As the period under consideration, 1777-1880, drew to a close, such
narrow and restrictive limitations were ascribed to the function of mandamus by the courts as to make it appear that the earliest case of
mandamus0 5 was more liberal and remedial than the most recent. A
statute had authorized the City of Troy to place its advertising in four
newspapers having the largest circulation. When this was done, a fifth
newspaper claiming the top circulation brought mandamus, in People
0 6 citing circulation figures in supex rel. Francis v. Common Council,1
port of its plaint and it was awarded the writ in the lower courts.
However, upon appeal, the high court stated that the provision for highest circulation was not enacted for the benefit of the newspapers but
was in the public interest, leading the court to rule that it was questionable whether the relator had "standing in court, to compel the municipal body to employ them." 0 7 The traditional function of mandamus
"to compel the performance of mere ministerial acts" was noted and
the converse rule was invoked that where the duty "is in its nature
103. People ex rel. New York Inebriate Asylum v. Osborn, 57 Barb. 663, 670 (N.Y. Sup.
CL 1870). See also People ex rel. Otsego County Bank v. Board of Superisors, 51 N.Y.
401, 408-09 (1873); People ex rel. Vanderlinden v. fartin, 58 Barb. 286, 288 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1870).
104. People ex rel. Thurston v. Board of To,n Auditors, 20 Hun 150, 152 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 82 N.Y. 80 (1880).
105. People v. Justices of Delaware Common Pleas, 1 Johns. Cas. 181 (1799) (per
curiam), supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
106. 78 N.Y. 33 (1879).
107. Id. at 38-39.
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judicial, or involves the exercise of judicial power or discretion, irrespective of the general character of the officer or body," 1 8 mandamus
will not go. A subordinate body cannot be directed to act in a particular
way in exercising its judgment, the court ruled. It is the character of
the duty and not the nature of the body or officer, contrary to the Taylor
holding, that determines whether mandamus will lie.
Where a
the duty
the fact,
made to

subordinate body is vested with power to determine a question of fact,
is judicial, and though it can be compelled by mandamus to determine
it cannot be directed to decide in a particular way, however clearly it be
appear what the decision ought to be. 109

People ex rel. Francis v. Common Council provided an accurate,
authoritative statement of the existing law and that which was to prevail
for the next thirty years. The major objection to the opinion is that it
characterized a determination of fact as one which was immune from
any review by a higher tribunal despite a serious challenge to the
probity of the facts in the record. The court foreclosed further inquiry
by holding that any official person or body became judicialized by
reason of having to determine a fact, which in turn freed it from any
surveillance by a superior tribunal. The court of appeals concluded that
it was not the province of the lower courts, viz., special and general
terms, "to determine the question of fact in the first instance, and direct
what particular paper or papers should be designated."110 Here, again, is
a correct statement of the proper function of the courts because the
power of decision in the first instance had been given to a specific body
clothed with jurisdiction to determine the same. However, patently unfair or improper compliance with the requirements of law by disregard
of the facts should not be condoned or ignored which is what the
highest court wound up doing here. It noted that the four chosen newspapers were not parties to the proceeding, which contradicted its earlier
argument that the public interest was the sole criterion in the enactment
of the statute for advertising in the papers with the highest circulation;
it noted further that they had already embarked on their services and
that an additional expense might be imposed upon the city if the mandamus were granted. The court of appeals should have stated the proper
governing principles in a firm manner to guide and impress future action

of such bodies in the exercise of their judgment; it should not have
allowed them to believe that consummation would carry the day no
matter how wrong and illegal the action.' General and special terms
were reversed.
108.
109.

Id. at 39.
Ibid.

110. Id. at 40.
111. Cf. People ex rel. Johnson v. Board of Supervisors, 45 N.Y. 196, 206 (1871);
People ex rel. Stephens v. Halsey, 37 N.Y. 344, 346 (1867).
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People ex rel. Francis v. Common Council shows that after a century
of development of the New York legal system, the term "judicial" continued to be used freely and interchangeably with "discretion" to strike
down applications for mandamus; some voices, however, were beginning
to be raised against this loose practice."1 The widespread tendency to
equate discretion with judicial action, thereby immunizing such action
from judicial review and control, was an ingenious device, but in the
long run the use of the term "judicial" to block off examination of administrative discretion delayed the formulation of more realistic rules for
judicial review by many decades.
III. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The earliest New York statutory enactment on the subject of
mandamus, in 1788, wisely re-enacted a statute adopted in England almost a century earlier."' The New York statute" 4 essentially provided
that after a return and reply were made in mandamus, the party suing
out the writ, if he should prevail, would also have the remedy of damages
as if he had prosecuted an action on the case for a false return. This
early statute also authorized the supreme court to fix rules for periods
of time required to plead in such proceedings as it "shall deem just
and reasonable." The provision allowing damages, as in an action on a
false return, was an effort to avoid needless circuity of action where it
was claimed that false matter in the return precluded a proper determination on the merits, the return having always been regarded as conclusive of the facts pleaded therein." 5 Actually, this enactment was
unnecessary because the 1777 constitution provided for the continued
application of English statute law until changed by the state legislature." 6 The provision for awarding damages, although somewhat altered
in purpose and effect, is still part of article 78 proceedings."' The authority given to the supreme court in regard to fixing the time for the
service of pleadings shows that from 1777 to 1788, at least, the English
practice was fully followed in all respects. The New York courts continued to be governed by English mandamus precedents in practice
matters and in many other respects until well past the middle of the
nineteenth century. 118
112. People ex rel. Hotchkiss v. Board of Supervisors, 65 N.Y. 222, 226-27 (1875).
113. Act of 1710, 9 Anne, c.20.
114. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1788, ch. 11, U]U2, 3, 6.
115. See People ex rel. Aspinwall v. Supervisors of Richmond, 28 N.Y. 112 (1863);
People ex rel. Shaut v. Champion, 16 Johns. R. 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
116. N.Y. Const. art. XXXV (1777). Cf. 1 N.Y. Rev. Laws 526 (1813).
117. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. § 7806; see also N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1300.
118. See, e.g., People ex rel. Aspinwall v. Supervisors of Richmond, 28 N.Y. 112,
114 (1863).
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Although mandamus actions were in wide use by the time the wholesale consolidation of the adjective and substantive law was effected by
the Revised Statutes in 1829, a mere handful of procedural provisions,
taken mainly from the 1788 enactment, were carried over into the codification."1 9 They were deemed so negligible as to be combined into a
single article with the provisions for the writ of prohibition. Included
were the most elementary rules of pleading, venue, verdict and damages,
res judicata, time for pleading and for contempt action for disobeying
the order of mandamus. These few provisions evidently exhausted all of
the apparent need for a mandamus procedure at that time. The session
laws of the subsequent years show that no essential change was effected,
thereby leaving to the common-law courts the full power and responsibility to work out necessary accommodations to changing conditions.
Indeed, existing statutory provisions for mandamus were so highly
esteemed that the Code of Procedure of 1848, as amended, specifically
excepted mandamus from any alteration. 2 ' It is entirely possible that the
legislators of the mid-nineteenth century considered that the complex
problem of adapting the ancient prerogative writs to a wholly different
system of government in a new land required the free play of the pragmatic genius of the common law. This was sound theory because the
prerogative writs were the handiwork of the common-law courts of an
earlier and different political society. Unfortunately, judicial preconceptions of tradition and blind adherence to precedent were permitted to
stifle the viable development in New York of some areas of mandamus
law. Until the Code of Civil Procedure went into effect in September
1880, the provisions of the 1788 enactment, with but minor additions and
alterations, remained the sole statutory contribution to the subject. 12 1
This is a remarkably meager record of legislation for a remedy so extensively employed in the courts during a period of far-reaching change.
The legislative self-abnegation in this area is all the more remarkable
because other branches of adjective law had been made subject to detailed rules of procedure in the Revised Statutes, the 1848 Code of
Procedure and in subsequent legislation.
IV. DuTY To ACT
The fundamental concept of mandamus was based upon the root principle that there was a duty incumbent upon a public body or official to
119. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 591-92, §§ 54-60 (1829).
120. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1848, ch. 379, § 390; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1849, ch. 438, § 471; N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1852, ch. 392, § 471.

121. See, e.g., N.Y. Sess. Laws 1854, ch. 270; N. Y. Sess. Laws 1873, ch. 70. See also
Weintraub, Statutory Procedures Governing Judicial Review of Administrative Action,
38 St. John's L. Rev. 86 (1963), for the period from 1880 to the present.

MANDAMUS AND CERTIORARI

1964]

act ina prescribed manner in regard to a matter in which the relator had
a vested interest. It was a concept diametrically opposed to that of discretion because the element of choice was not present, the duty and the
function usually being classified as merely ministerial. Some of the early
litigation arose out of genuine doubt by an official of his power to act in
certain circumstances, and such hesitation is understandable where civil
and criminal sanctions may ensue upon the wrong choice of action by an
official.' 2 2 For example, the state canal commissioners were reluctant to
act upon a claim founded on the diversion of waters incident to the construction of the Erie Canal. Mandamus was brought to compel them to
enter an appraisal of damages for this aspect of damage and the court
upheld the application. 23 The court determined, as a matter of law, that
relators presented an interest which entitled them to an appraisal although the extent of the damages was a matter ultimately reserved for
the discretion of the commissioners.
Again, where the canal commissioners were uncertain as to whether
the abstention -of one dissenting commissioner from voting upon an
award agreed to by the other two commissioners invalidated the action,
the court found that the facts being undisputed and a valid appraisal
having been made, the commissioners were duty-bound to pay the
amount of damages fixed in the award. 2 4 The court used the occasion to
note that "every officer is presumed to have done his duty." Not all such
applications are granted, however, because where a right to specified
official action is claimed, the statutory conditions for putting that action
into motion must be fully met. So, in a case where relator's land had been
taken for default in payment of quit-rents, the application for redemption was rightfully refused by the state comptroller because relator had
omitted to serve the notice required by statute.5
Nor was a landowner entitled to a mandamus against a municipal body
which, having caused estimates of the cost of an acquisition to be made
by commissioners for a public improvement, declined to take further
action because the estimates ran too high.12 ' The court defined the office
of mandamus as being applicable, "in general, in all cases where the injured party has a right to any thing done, and no other specific means of
compelling its performance." But "until the proceedings have progressed
122.
123.
granted
124.
125.

Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 117, 120 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1846).
Ex parte Jennings, 6 Cow. 518 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1826), peremptory mandamus
sub nom. People ex rel. Jennings v. Seymour, 6 Cow. 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
Ex parte Rogers, 7 Cow. 526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
People ex rel. Ainsworth v. Comptroller of State of N.Y., 1 Wend. 301 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. 1828).

126. People ex rel. Dikeman v. President of Village of Brooklyn, 1 Wend. 318, 325
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
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so far as to give mutual rights to the parties, the trustees have a discretion, and may refuse to proceed; but after rights become vested, by
virtue of these proceedings, they cannot refuse, with impunity, to proceed.",2 7
Where mere ministerial acts were involved, the courts would not
allow the ministerial officer to go afield into collateral matters not confided to him under the guise of exercising discretion. Thus, upon application by a minor already authorized to be appointed a commissioner of
deeds, the clerk of common pleas who was delegated to administer the
oath of office refused to act because a minor cannot hold a civil office in
the state.1 8 The court held that upon the production of the commission
the clerk was required to administer the oath. His was only a ministerial
function, excluding any element of choice or discretion.
V. No OTHER SPECIFIC LEGAL REMEDY

In the words of an English authority often cited in mandamus decisions during the first century of New York's statehood, the writ "ought
to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific
remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be
one."' 2 9 However, it is to be "regarded as an auxiliary, to be called into
action when the regular forces prove unequal to the emergency, and
supplements some defects in the administration of justice.' 8 0 The "regular forces," the common-law remedies, were not equipped to deal with
the constant changes and developments in government, in society and
in the evolution of individual rights and interests where they touched
the citizen's relation to his government, so mandamus went out to meet
these new demands in the interests of justice.13 '
General term of the supreme court found much to criticize, however,
in the increased practice of settling complicated questions in summary
fashion solely on the basis of affidavits in mandamus actions. It held that
the public interest involved in the payment of considerable sums of
money was ill-served by a summary disposition depending upon such selfserving documentation.' 2 The court was of the firm opinion that con127. Id. at 324-25. Cf. People ex rel. Fountain v. Board of Supervisors, 4 Barb. 64
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); People ex rel. Fiske v. Common Council of City of Brooklyn,
22 Barb. 404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856).
128. People ex rel. Dobbs v. Dean, 3 Wend. 438 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
129. Introduction to 3 Bacon, Abridgement of the Law: Mandamus 535 (6th ed. 1793).
130. People ex rel. Johnson v. Martin, 62 Barb. 570, 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
131. People v. Supervisors of County of Columbia, 10 Wend. 363, 367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1833); People ex rel. Dikeman v. President of Village of Brooklyn, 1 Wend. 318 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1828); Ex parte Bostwick, 1 Cow. 143 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
132. People ex rel. Bagley v. Green, 1 Hun 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874). Cf. People ex
rel. Taylor v. Brennan, 39 Barb. 522, 547 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863) (dissenting opinion).
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flicting issues of fact should be decided by a jury according to the course
of the common law. 13 3 That viewpoint ultimately found its way into the
code provisions governing procedure for state writs. 3 4 In the Bagley
case, the mandamus was denied because a complete remedy by legal action was deemed to be available.
The courts, meanwhile, continued to wrestle with the question of
whether availability of a suit at law against a public official would preclude recourse to mandamus. Relator had been awarded a peremptory
mandamus by general term which directed the defendant supervisor and
railroad commissioners of a town to pay interest on certain bonds held
by him. In the court of appeals it was argued that relator could bring an
action on the case against defendants. However, such a suit would not
be for the amount of interest but for unliquidated damages by reason of
the wrongful action of defendants in refusing to pay over money owed
to relator.'35 This was plainly an inadequate legal remedy and if it were
accepted to stave off mandamus, it would result in the rejection of many
mandamus actions of like nature. It was ruled that "where a particular
method of raising money for local public purposes is prescribed by statute, the party entitled to receive it has a right to the full and perfect
execution of the power conferred, which may be enforced by the writ of
mandamus." 36 The order of the lower court was reversed, however, upon
other grounds. With utmost cogency, the court indicated that a particular mode of action prescribed by law could always be enforced by
mandamus in the interest of an individual claiming the benefit thereof,
especially where existing common-law remedies provided less than full
satisfaction. According to the Mead case, the existence of a legal remedy
which is less than perfect would not bar a claim for mandamus relief
which was otherwise meritorious.
VI. CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT

It would appear self-evident that before an extraordinary legal remedy
such as mandamus could be invoked, the claimant should be able to show
a clear legal right to the relief requested. The phrase, "clear legal right,"
was first used in a case which was largely concerned with another requirement of the mandamus writ, viz., the lack of any legal remedy. The
court there categorically announced that "the party asking7 for a manda3
mus must have a clear legal right," else it will be denied.
133. See also People ex rel. Tenth Natl Bank v. Board of Apportionment, 3 Hun 11
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874), aff'd per curiam, 64 N.Y. 627 (1876).
134. N.Y. Code Civ. P. §§ 2083, 2084 (1880).
135. People ex rel. Fiedler v. Mead, 24 N.Y. 114, 119-20 (1861).
136. Id. at 123; see also People ex rel. Ryan v. Green, 58 N.Y. 295, 306 (1874).
137. People v. Supervisors of County of Columbia, 10 Wend. 363, 366 (N.Y. Sup.
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A fairly frequent function for mandamus, albeit largely unsuccessful
at first, was its use by disappointed low bidders on public contracts. In
a particularly interesting case in 1852, one Yates had been low bidder
on certain canal work and he was given the job. He insisted, however,
that the board adopt a formal resolution awarding the contract work to
him; the board refused and he brought mandamus. The court could
find no precedent for requiring the board to execute a contract with relator. The decision specified that "'the party asking for a mandamus
must have a clear legal right . . . ,' " which the court decided did not exist
there.' 38 Whether a contract should be awarded to relator was, according to the court, a question of public right and relator, as a citizen, had
no right to the mandamus he requested. 3 9 The court further stated that
relator had no individual, private interest in being awarded the contract
and that only the public weal should govern whether such a contract
was to be awarded. In this the court plainly erred because it is quite obvious that relator did acquire an individual interest in having the work
formally awarded to him, for he had been instructed to proceed, and the
detail of securing suitable protection by means of a resolution was merely
ancillary to that fact. What probably troubled the court was that low
bidders on public contracts had not acquired full legal status at that
early date and the court was uncertain whether it should create such a
legal right in the low bidder.
The rule laid down in the Yates case was soon reinforced in another
low bidder's application for mandamus where his bid had been rejected
because of a minor defect in the verification of the bid papers. The court
reiterated that an applicant for the writ must have a clear legal right, and
a low bidder's public works proposal created no legal right until a contract was made. 140 It adverted to several reasons why a low bid may be
rejected without even touching the merits of the bidder's proposals. In a
lucid analysis of the reasons for taking bids on public works contracts,
the court skillfully analyzed away any legal right in the low bidder to be
awarded the contract, stating: "Besides, these various laws were made,
not to give a right to the lowest bidder to have a contract made with him;
they were not made for his benefit, but for the benefit of the public alone,
Ct. 1833). See also People ex rel. Perkins v. Hawkins, 46 N.Y. 9, 10 (1871); People ex
rel. Mygatt v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N.Y. 563, 574 (1854); People ex rel. Dikeman
v. President of Village of Brooklyn, 1 Wend. 318, 324-25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
138.

People ex rel. Yates v. Canal Bd., 13 Barb. 432, 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852).

139. Id. at 448.
140. People ex rel. Dinsmore v. Croton Aqueduct Bd., 26 Barb. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1857).
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and that the public might have the work done at the lowest price."'4 This
remains the law in the federal field."
Towards the end of the period under study, it became established
beyond cavil that mandamus would not issue in cases of doubtful right." 3
In this respect, the attitude of the courts approached that of the courts
of equity when application was made for an injunction, that relief would
only be granted where a clear right was infringed or in danger of being
damaged. In addition, the requirement would appear to be both logical
and reasonable in view of the fact that the method of proof varies from
the course of the common law, and government machinery is being placed
into motion at the instance of, and usually for the sole benefit of, an
individual requesting action against the government itself.
VII.

JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN GRANTING MANDAMUS

A vital condition annexed to the issuance of mandamus, and frequently
found in close concert with availability of another legal remedy and clear
-legal right, is the power of the supreme court to issue or to deny the writ
in its discretion. The discretionary character of mandamus patently
derived from its prerogative origins; the public interest was paramount
and always governed the conditions under which the writ would issue.
This rule evolved relatively early in the development of mandamus.
It was cited in a case where a doctor was refused admission to the Orange
County Medical Society on the ground that he did not follow accepted
medical methods and had slandered the society, whereupon the doctor
brought mandamus. 4 4 The court sided with the medical society, describing relator as a "quack" who would be expelled soon after being admitted
to the society. In its "discretion," therefore, the court denied the application for mandamus to admit relator. This was a decision of doubtful
validity because petitioner had complied with all requirements for his
admission and, in addition, if his eventual expulsion was a serious prospect, he was entitled by law to a hearing before the county judges. It was
much like a decision by Lord Mansfield where the Chief Justice of King's
Bench refused to restore a person to public office on the ground that the
official body could legally remove him as soon as he was restored. 4

A more discriminating use of the court's discretion to issue or withhold a mandamus arose in a conflict between two opposing court orders.
141.

Id. at 252.

142.
143.

Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
People ex rel. Duff v. Booth, 49 Barb. 31 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1867); People ex rel.

Hackley v. Croton Aqueduct Bd., 49 Barb. 259 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1867); People ex rel.
Dennis v. Brennan, 45 Barb. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866).
144. Ex parte Paine, 1 Ell 665, 668 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
145. Rex v. Mayor of Axbridge, 2 Cowp. 523, 98 Eng. Rep. 1220 (K.B. 1177).
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A common pleas judge had issued an order for the imprisonment of a
debtor, but a United States court enjoined enforcement of the order.
Upon an application for mandamus to compel common pleas to go
through with the imprisonment, the supreme court fell back upon its
prerogative and remarked that "it would be very indiscreet to place the
judge between two fires, as we should do by granting this motion. 140 The
court wisely denied the application despite the fact that there was a clear
legal right to enforcement of the order and no other specific legal remedy
was available.
Sometimes what a court likes to call its discretion in granting or withholding the writ is really the result of the court's evaluation and resolution of interior legal questions. Thus, where a low bidder on a public
contract lost out to the next higher bidder who had already commenced
work on the public improvement, the court of appeals reversed general
term and denied mandamus. 47 The court, in discussing its discretion,
noted that no property of relator had been taken and that his claim
rested "upon the interests of the State to have its work done by the lowest
bidder, and not upon a legal right on his part."'148 These are legal questions which did not directly involve the discretion of the court. However,
the court did advert to the inconvenient fact that the other contractor
was already engaged in the work and it saw no way in which the denial to
relator could be undone; nor would it have the state, although wrong in
this case, pay compensation to two contractors to vindicate a mere
principle.
The court's discretion is, therefore, a constant and vital element in the
ultimate right to the issuance of any mandamus. This is understandable
for the additional reason that the court is ofttimes dealing with the powers
of another coordinate arm of the government. Also, the balance of advantage between public and private interests, where those interests conflict,
must always be carefully weighed and the greater must give way to the
lesser. By the mandamus writ, the state tells itself to do a certain thing
in the interest of individual or group justice, except when the greater
interest of the state intervenes. As the court of appeals said in the Belden
case: "The courts cannot correct all the evils incident to the administration of government ...

,I

Designed to achieve remedial justice, man-

damus must never be allowed to become a device for perpetrating a
greater injustice than the one it was called upon to suppress; nor should
146. Ex parte Fleming, 4 Hill 581, 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
147. People ex rel. Belden v. Contracting Bd., 27 N.Y. 378 (1863); accord, Cestone Bros.
v. Solowinski, 276 App. Div. 970, 95 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d Dep't 1950) (memorandum
decision).
148. 27 N.Y. at 382.
149. Ibid.
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it be allowed to issue where a patently larger public interest will thereby
become subordinated to a lesser private interest.
VIII.

LirITs ON THE POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT

Although the supreme court is the tribunal of general, original jurisdiction over legal matters in the State, 5 ° it nonetheless cannot entertain
every controversy which seeks to enlist the aid of its powers of mandamus. But one early effort to restrict its broad power to award mandamus relief, on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to act, in
Ex parte Heath,'5 ' was not crowned with success. Relators claimed to
have been elected to various offices in the City of New York where the
results were in close dispute, and they requested mandamus requiring the
mayor to administer the oath of office to them. It was argued that the
common council, as in the case of other legislative bodies, is the sole judge
of the election of its members, thereby ousting the supreme court of
jurisdiction. The court, however, fell back upon English cases which held
that only express words will take away jurisdiction, and awarded the
mandamus requested.
In another case, at about the same time, 1842, where the statutory
language provided that the actions of the canal commissioners were "final
and conclusive," the court was compelled to concede, on the other hand,
that it was without power to examine the case. 152 Likewise, where replacement of relator as a brigadier general in the state militia was challenged
by mandamus, the court acknowledged that the constitution and the laws
of the State vested the Governor with definitive discretion in such
matters, leaving no more power in the supreme court than it would have
to "review his acts in granting pardons or nominating to office."" The
court perhaps goes a little further than necessary in according blanket
authority and power to the Governor, for there may arise that case where
the exercise of his powers in regard to the militia is attended by clear and
specific statutory conditions which should then be a justiciable matter if
called into question.
In another instance where a species of executive discretion was involved, the court ruled that the attorney general of the State could not be
"mandamused" to "bring quo warranto proceedings to litigate the validity
of a disputed election." 5 4 The court said of the attorney general: "His
150. Matter of Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 258, 53 N.E. 1103, 1105 (1899).
151. 3 Hill 42, 50-53 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842), aff'd Ct. Err., June, 1842.
152. People ex rel. Durham v. Commissioners of the Canal Fund, 3 Hill 599, 604
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842). Cf. Lawton v. Commissioners of Highways, 2 Cai. R. 179 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1804), in regard to certiorari.
153. People ex rel. Lockwood v. Scrugham, 25 Barb. 216, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1857).
154. People ex rel. Peabody v. Attorney Gen., 22 Barb. 114, 116-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1856).
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office is a public trust. It is a legal presumption that he will do his duty;
that he will act with strict impartiality.... The exercise of such discretion is, in its nature, a judicial act, from which there is no appeal, and
over which the courts have no control.""', On the contrary, if he instituted
a quo warranto proceeding, the attorney general would not be exercising
a judicial function, but it was a commonplace of this period to describe
nonreviewable discretion or judgment as judicial in order to preclude
court review of the action. The decision was otherwise a valid one in
denying mandamus which sought to compel an officer of the executive
department to exercise his discretion in the particular mode desired by
relator.
In like manner, the legislative department of government has been
placed beyond the reach of mandamus, although this was not the rule in
the early days of New York jurisprudence.'
The immunity of legislative
bodies from mandamus received only passing notice in a case conspicuous
for other features. The Board of Supervisors of Schenectady County had
adopted a resolution establishing and apportioning county-wide values for
tax purposes, but then reconsidered and reapportioned them on the following day, whereupon relief was sought by mandamus to retain the original
valuations.'5 7 The multiple functions of such a body, exercising judicial,
executive and legislative powers, were properly noted.' 8 The court said
that the board did not function legislatively in respect to the setting and
apportioning of values because "it is to act under a law already made."' 5'
This comment is a valuable contribution to the clarification of a problem
which still vexes the courts in reviewing the action of similar bodies performing several functions of government. In that particular case, it was
held that the power exercised was judicial and under traditional judicial
practice, once exercised could not thereafter be recalled.
Using a concept announced in the foregoing case, general term directed
the Common Council of the City of New York, pursuant to state law, to
0
issue stock for the purchase of an area to be used as a public market.Y
The court viewed the action to be taken as ministerial rather than strictly
legislative, ruling: "They have no discretion in the matter as in the ordinary cases of municipal legislation; they must obey the supreme legisla155.
156.
1833).
157.

Id. at 118.
People v. Supervisors of County of Columbia, 10 Wend. 363 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct.

People ex rel. Thomson v. Board of Supervisors, 35 Barb. 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1861).
158. Id. at 415.
159. Id. at 413.
160. People ex rel. Commissioners v. Common Council of City of New York, 45 Barb.
473 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866).
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tion."'' This occurred in a day when general statutes were uncommon
and directory legislation from Albany pertaining to every type of local
problem issued in a steady stream.
The usual type of legislation, however, was not subject to judicial
review or direction by mandamus. This was established early, in People
ex rel. Lynch v. Mayor of City of New York. 1 2 The salary issue involved in the Lynch case would appear to have been more ministerial than
legislative in nature, however, and therefore amenable to mandamus.
IX.

STANDING

Although the cases referred to the necessity for an individual or personal
interest in the matter for which a mandamus is sought, the rule was sometimes bypassed by the court's adverting to the larger public interest which
enables any citizen to secure the writ in the interests of justice and good
government. 16 It must be remembered that a taxpayer action was unknown at this time so that mandamus was one of the few measures available to the public-spirited citizen interested in arresting public fraud,
chicanery and corruption which were quite rife in this period. Consequently, a personal or individual interest in the matter complained of was
not strictly enforced where mandamus was sought.'1 The rule was otherwise where one brought an ordinary action in law or equity in the general
capacity of a citizen. 165
X.

MANDAMUS-SUMMARY

The writ of mandamus first entered upon its responsibilities in an
atmosphere clouded by colonial hostility to English laws and institutions.
Notwithstanding this obstacle, James Kent and his brethren of the New
York Supreme Court of Judicature had small choice but to enlist the aid
of English legal authorities such as Coke, Blackstone, Bacon, Viner,
Comyns and Hawkins, and the judicial precedents of Holt and Mansfield
in order to cope with the diverse problems of the infant legal system.
The first constitution had also signified recognition of a need for following the established body of English law. Although detailed answers to
many questions springing from native conditions could not be directly
161.

Id. at 474-75.

162.

25 Wend. 680 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).

163. People ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend. 56, 64-65 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1837). See also
People ex rel. Blacksmith v. Tracy, 1 Denio 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845); Commercial Bank
v. Canal Comm'rs, 10 Wend. 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832).

164. People ex rel. Stephens v. Halsey, 37 N.Y. 344, 346-47 (1867).
165. Roosevelt v. Draper, 23 N.Y. 318, 323 (1861); Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome
County, 18 N.Y. 155 (1858). Cf. Christopher v. Mayor of City of New York, 13 Barb.
567, 571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852).
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supplied by English legal authorities, they did provide a corpus juris, a
starting point for reasoned solutions which ultimately were transformed
into local law.
Mandamus played a prominent part in the development of New York
law by answering a serious procedural deficiency in the early, fragmentary
law of the State. It acquired immediate popularity as a procedural device
to facilitate judicial review of intermediate matters not otherwise subject
to certiorari or writ of error review. Under normal circumstances such
a function should have been performed by certiorari. The urgent need for
this type of appellate device conspired, however, to place early mandamus
within the narrow compass of a mechanical, workhorse writ. Confined to
shuttling minor appeals between courts, the traditional function of mandamus as an original writ of justice to require compliance with the law
was completely overshadowed.
Owing to the paucity of indigenous law and the slow, patchwork process
of adapting English law to local conditions, there could hardly be any
meaningful symmetry or consistency in the formative period of our law.
In addition, the exigencies of particular cases, the lack of a native legal
tradition, the sparse legal authorities and precedents available, and the
limited learning of the judges all combined to shape the emergence of
mandamus along narrow, simplified lines. Nevertheless, principles fundamental to the operation of the writ of mandamus were fashioned early in
our legal history under the impetus of a spreading need for and reliance
upon that ancient remedy.
For example, in spite of the widespread mechanical use of mandamus as
an auxiliary writ of review, tentative efforts appeared early in the nineteenth century to explore its relationship to the complex problem of controlling arbitrary exercise of discretion. The greatest impulse to this trend
arose out of the absence of an appellate procedure to bring up intermediate
matters involving the exercise of discretion by inferior judicial tribunals.
However, the dichotomy between the traditional use of mandamus to
require performance of a ministerial act (lacking any element of choice)
and the simultaneous effort to develop the writ to review consummated,
arbitrary exercise of discretion (exemplifying the very essence of choice)
presented an apparent contradiction and resulted in confusion. Out of the
confusing and conflicting mandamus decisions which wrestled with the
dual objectives of the writ, the courts somehow managed to hammer out
enduring insights regarding the nature and quality of discretion. The
effort to control exercise of arbitrary discretion came to an early end
because judicial bodies were primarily the object of attack and the
and the overtaxed reviewing courts, reluctant to lay restraints upon the
lower judiciary, invoked century-old English precedents to doom the
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effort. The reach of the rule of nonreviewability was indiscriminately
extended to include legislative and administrative bodies exercising discretionary functions which thereby immunized a wide range of activities
from the scrutiny of judicial review by mandamus.
In assessing this period we should not lose sight of the achievement
accomplished by the reviewing courts in forging a complete arsenal of
working rules for mandamus out of their everyday confrontation with
practical problems. Legislative inaction in this area of the law allowed the
courts to engage in a species of legislative activity to fill large gaps in
procedural law, and in the end to formulate a species of substantive law.
It enabled the courts to utilize a wider range of choice from the competing
considerations in each case, and later the most desirable results were
codified into the Code of Civil Procedure.
It is also notable that there was complete acceptance by the courts of
the role and reliability of administrative bodies in discharging important
functions of government. These bodies were accorded a wide latitude of
action because they exercised a combination of legislative, administrative, judicial and executive functions, but the lines of distinction between
these functions were not clearly perceived in the early decades of the
nineteenth century. The so-called judicial nature of some of their functions had led to their becoming relatively free from judicial interference
or control by mandamus, as witness the protective label "judicial" affixed
to much administrative action when court review was denied on that
specific ground.
Although the hold of absolute discretion was not appreciably altered
by means of mandamus review, it must be emphasized that the writ was in
active and extensive use throughout the first century of New York legal
history for many purposes previously unknown to the law. Many acts of
government, other than the purely legislative and judicial, were brought
into closer conformity with the requirements of law, to the ultimate advantage of both citizen and government.
PART TWO: COMMON-LAW CERTIORARI
I.

BEGINNINGS

In contrast to the comparative lack of early statutory provisions governing the use of mandamus in the State of New York, certiorari was
widely employed in the very first years for bringing up decisions of
inferior tribunals for appellate review by the supreme court and common
pleas. Its greatest use was sanctioned by a statute of 1801,10 which
provided for review of certain justice court judgments, orders and pro166. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1801, ch. 165, § 19.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807).

See Nicoll v. Dunlap, 2 Johns. R. 195
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ceedings upon certiorari issuing from the supreme court. Review of criminal indictments and presentments by means of certiorari was also
authorized in that same year, 67 so that even before our formal law reports
were issued in 1804,108 certiorari was already in constant use as a statutory writ of review. Consequently, the employment of certiorari in nonstatutory situations was more quickly grasped and refinements in practice
and procedure were achieved much earlier than in mandamus. Rules
applicable to statutory certiorari were unhesitatingly carried over to
common-law certiorari, in the absence of an adequate body of law in that
area.
The common-law writ of certiorari, as received by the new State, issued
out of the supreme court, commanding tribunals and officers exercising
powers affecting the property or rights of citizens, to return the record
of their proceedings to that court for examination. 0 0 It was intended to
perform the same function as an appeal in the absence of a specific procedure for court review of the action of inferior tribunals and magistrates.
As noted in the study of mandamus, early law reports were scarce and
there was heavy reliance upon English practice, precedents and text
authorities. In a highway case 7 ' which is typical of the controversies
which engaged the attention of New York courts in their infant years in
this area of law, a landowner brought his dispute with a turnpike company into the supreme court by common-law certiorari upon allegations
that the statutory procedure for acquiring his property had not been
followed. The court, after citing several leading English cases, expressed
zealous concern for the protection of property rights and stated that
where laws interfere with those rights they must be strictly adhered to.
It determined that because a disagreement as to the terms of the acquisition did not actually exist, and because of the omission of other facts
showing jurisdiction to act, there was no legal basis for the appointment
of commissioners of arbitration. The court granted the application to
set aside the inquisition under which the arbitrators were to act. Common-law certiorari had been set upon the right path in its infancy here.
The leading case for over fifty years of certiorari law came quite early
in New York history in a decision rendered by the supreme court in
Lawton v. Commissioners of Highways.'7 ' Plaintiff claimed that a road
which had been laid out by defendant highway commissioners, and
affirmed on appeal by common pleas, was not of the width required by
statute and had not been requested as necessary by twelve freeholders.
167. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1801, ch. 13.
168. Preface, 1 Johns. Cas.
169. Dunlap, The New York Justice 61 (1815).
170. Gilbert v. Columbia Turnpike Co., 3 Johns. Cas. 107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802).
171. 2 Cai. R. 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
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Defendant commissioners argued that the statute made the decision of
common pleas conclusive and therefore the supreme court was precluded
from reviewing it by certiorari, thus raising a complex issue for resolution
by the fledgling tribunal. The court replied that where the property or
rights of a citizen are involved, even if the statute makes the action final,
the supreme court retained jurisdiction to review because inferior jurisdictions must be subject to the corrective action of higher courts.-1 2 Although the return did not show that the width of the road complied with
the statute nor that twelve freeholders had requested the road as necessary, the court indicated that it would presume that these requirements
had been met. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed, but inferior
tribunals were now placed on notice that their proceedings were subject
to examination by the supreme court for conformity to legal requirements
notwithstanding the existence of a statutory provision stamping their
action as conclusive.
Although extensively cited for decades afterwards, the Lawton case
constitutes a weak decision because instead of requiring the lower
tribunal to show that it acquired jurisdiction to act by virtue of the two
statutory conditions, the court merely attached a label of presumptive
regularity to the actions of the highway commissioners. In form, Judge
Spencer said that the supreme court will review, but in substance, the
opinion glossed over the issues of jurisdictional fact governing the power
and authority of the highway commissioners to act. Despite its sound
pronouncements and the high standing of the jurist who wrote the opinion,
later cases would require affirmative proof in the return that the facts
relating to jurisdiction were presented to the inferior tribunal, and mere
reliance upon a presumption of regularity would not suffice. What emerges
as the lasting grace of the decision is the strong stand taken that lower
tribunals and officers are subject to the supervisory review of the supreme
court and will therefore be required to stand such examination upon
common-law certiorari, notwithstanding preclusionary language emanating from the legislature.
Citing the Lawton case as authority, another early case, Wildy v.
Washburn,173 announced that "wherever the rights of an individual are
infringed by the acts of persons clothed with authority to act, and who
exercise that authority illegally, and to the injury of an individual, the
person injured may have redress by certiorari ... .",7 A rather broad
172. Id. at 182. An earlier case, Jones v. Reed, 1 Johns. Cas. 20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799),
had required the return to show express proof of power to act; nothing was to be assumed
by implication. See also Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. R. 395, 437 (N.Y. 1811).
173. 16 Johns. R. 49 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819).
174. Ibid.
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jurisdiction was thereby asserted which ignored the nature of the initial
action brought up for review in that case-a disputed election-and the
type of tribunal there involved-justices of the peace filling a vacancy in
public office pursuant to statute. This action was not in the nature of a
judicial act, the essential basis of certiorari jurisdiction to review. But in
view of the large powers given to highway commissioners, turnpike companies,'175 and others, some general assurance that protection against
abuse of official power was available seemed to have become necessary.
Although the Wildy case had been in certiorari, the scope of official action
referred to could have encompassed areas of mandamus jurisdiction under
the language cited above. At this point in our legal development, however,
the lines between certiorari and mandamus were somewhat blurred because the courts had not reached the point of defining "judicial" action
(reviewable by certiorari) and "ministerial" action (reviewable by
mandamus) adequately, if at all. In fact, the basic problem was not
resolved procedurally until the finely spun distinctions between certiorari
and mandamus were wiped out by the adoption of article 78 in 1937.170
"The necessity of a superintending power to revise the proceedings and
correct the irregularitiescommitted by inferior officers, cannot be questioned . . ." held an important case, Lynde v. Noble,'177 in 1822, where
the court was considering a motion to quash a certiorari taken out to
review eviction proceedings pending in a lower court. The motion to quash
was granted, but not before the court had noted its authority over
inferior courts and persons "invested by the Legislature with power to
decide on the property or rights of the citizens, even in cases where they are
authorized by Statute finally to hear and determine; and this power can
only be taken away by express words."1 7

The court cited Lawton and

English precedents in support of its position. At this stage the supreme
court had not reached the point where it seriously distinguished between
certiorari authorized by statute and common-law certiorari. Lynde v.
Noble was in the former class and the quoted language was unnecessary
dicta because the statute specifically provided for review by certiorari.
In addition to reasserting the power to review determinations affecting
property and rights which would otherwise go unreviewed, the supreme
court enunciated an important principle which is still operative in administrative law. It ruled, adversely to the party bringing the certiorari, that a
proceeding then pending would not be removed until the lesser tribunal
had reached a decision, else the supreme court would be acting as a court
175. Bradhurst v. Southwestern Turnpike Co., 16 Johns. R. 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1819). See
also People v. Runkel, 6 Johns. R. 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (per curiam).
176. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 526, §§ 1283-1306.
177. 20 Johns. R. 80, 83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
178. Id. at 82.
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of original jurisdiction in the matter, and the purpose of certiorari in
vesting the court with revisory powers would be lost. Thus there was
established at an early date the rule requiring a final administrative
determination before a party can secure judicial review. In Lynde v.
Noble, the applicant's error was understandable because certiorari had
long been utilized to remove criminal proceedings for review by a superior
body before their conclusion. This decision made it quite clear that the
rule applicable to criminal certiorari would not be extended to civil
litigation.

II.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The early decisions of the supreme court had accomplished little more
than to pre-empt the general areas for intercession by common-law
certiorari. The primary objective of confining inferior tribunals and
officers within their legal authority and jurisdiction having been achieved
by certiorari review, the court then faced the infinitely more difficult
problem of working out the nature and scope of that review. Before it
could get fairly started upon formulating the broad outlines of an
approach, the court was confronted with a perplexing problem which
remains relatively unsolved to this day.
Sewers had been installed in Canal Street, New York City, and plaintiff complained of the small number of property owners, like himself, who
were assessed for the cost of the improvement despite the fact that a
much larger number of owners in the area would derive a benefit from the
installation. Plaintiff argued, in LeRoy v. Mayor of New York, 7 ' in 1823,
that defendants must exercise a legal discretion in fixing the area to be
assessed for the cost of the sewer. Defendants rejoined that according
to New York and English precedents, the reviewing court does not
examine into the merits but only determines whether "the inferior tribunal
has exceeded its jurisdiction."1 0 This was an accurate statement of the
law of that time. But the court replied as follows:
Who are to be comprehended in an assessment, depends on the principle on which

it is made; that must be determined by a sound construction of the law, applied
to the facts. It does not rest in the discretion of those who are to execute the law.
The superintending power of this court is competent to establish the principle, and
compel the inferior authority to be governed by it; leaving to its discretion the
manner of levying, and the amount of contribution, to be exacted from each
individual.18 '

Although the statute was silent on the extent and scope of the benefit
assessment to be levied, the court itself adopted the corollary principle
179.

20 Johns. R. 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).

180. Id. at 437.
181. Id. at 439-40.
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that all who benefit to a degree, which it never clearly specified, must share
the burden of the cost of the sewer, and it vacated the assessment previously made. Most important, the rule was postulated that ascertainment
of legislative intention from statutory language was solely a judicial
function. "It does not rest in the discretion of those who are to execute the
law."
The decision raises as many questions as it answers. Despite a discretion confided to defendants by the general terms of the enabling statute,
the court nevertheless arrogated to itself the power of passing upon the
discretion exercised in the distribution of the financial burden to be imposed upon the area. Until that time, the major test in certiorari review
was whether there was the power to do the act; once jurisdiction was
established, there was no other basis for interference by the court. But
the legal principle engrafted by the court upon the exercise of discretion
here was not susceptible to uniform, objective application. Questions of
degree of benefit invariably arise upon such assessments and are peculiarly suited for the administration, not for the judiciary; the latter was
only required to test the exercise of power on the bare question of jurisdiction. The cases had held that within their jurisdiction, inferior bodies,
like the courts, could make poor decisions without being overturned if a
positive rule of law or statutory requirement was not abridged.' 82 The
court may have detected a serious injustice in this case, but it again
proved the axiom that "hard cases make bad law." LeRoy v. Mayor of
New York quickly acquired status as authority for examining such assessment proceedings by means of certiorari, but it was narrowly construed
to authorize an inquiry only into the principles of the assessment, not the
amount. 1 3 But the question specifically raised in LeRoy v. Mayor of New
York has presented a thorny problem to the courts for more than three
18 4
centuries and it has not yet been laid to rest.
The law of certiorari was restored to its normal channel of operation,
strictly speaking, in Starr v. Trustees of Rochester,185 where a building
of the value of $800 was removed from a street which was being altered.
Statute law prohibited the alteration of a street where the value of a
building to be removed exceeded one hundred dollars, and plaintiff tax182.

Woolsey v. Tompkins, 23 Wend. 324, 327

(N.Y.

Sup. Ct.

1840);

Birdsall v.

Phillips, 17 Wend. 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837).
183. Baldwin v. Calkins, 10 Wend. 167, 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833); Bouton v. President
of Brooklyn, 2 Wend. 395, 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
184. See Pinkus v. Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 16 App. Div. 2d 931, 230
N.Y.S.2d 670 (2d Dep't 1962) (memorandum decision); Rooke's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 99b,
77 Eng. Rep. 209 (C.P. 1598), treated in Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review
by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and Mandamus, 9 N.Y.,.F. 478, 505 (1963).
185. 6 Wend. 564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831).
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payers brought certiorari. The court acknowledged the limits on its
powers by stating that its review was
confined to an examination of the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunals, and to
questions of law arising out of their proceedings; not to an examination of their
decisions upon questions of fact.... It may be, and indeed is necessary for them
in their returns, to state such facts as are necessary to show their jurisdiction.,'

The court added that it would not review decisions on such questions of
fact. The certiorari was refused upon a technicality.
The Starr decision is valuable for its specificity as opposed to the
ambiguity of LeRoy v. Mayor of New York, which it in effect overruled.
In addition to re-establishing the prior rule that certiorari actions are
confined to a review of jurisdiction, it is notable for the introduction of
language which would ultimately lead to broader review upon questions of
jurisdictional fact. This would not come to pass for several decades, but
the basis for such inquiry was established by the reference made to
reviewing all "questions of law" and the necessity for the return "to state
such facts as are necessary to show their jurisdiction. '1 87 The court
evinced full awareness of the dichotomy between question of fact and
question of law, searching to evolve a rule to bring the latter question
under greater judicial control. In time the purely mechanical, judicial
review which ignored administrative action touching legal questions
would be supplanted by a form of appellate treatment in certiorari
actions.
A rather bold decision was the first contribution from the highest court,
the court of errors, on a point of certiorari law in President of Brooklyn
v. Patchen.18 Property had been taken for a street in Brooklyn and one
owner had requested an adjournment of the valuation proceedings to
enable his expert witness on property values to be present, but was
refused. The supreme court sustained certiorari in the owner's favor, and
in the high court Chancellor Walworth, in affirming, laid it down as a
rule that "where palpable injustice has been done by an inferior jurisdiction in the exercise of a discretionary power,"'8 9 it may be corrected by
certiorari or mandamus. This is a rather long step in the general direction
laid down by the Starr case, but the court appears to have overextended
itself in treating of an adjournment, a matter usually confided to the
broad discretion of the lower body. Although the reversal was secured in
this case by means of certiorari, it must be remembered that the court of
errors was dealing with and overruling a lesser judicial tribunal. At this
186. Id. at 566. See also Tallman v. Bigelow, 10 Wend. 420 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1833).
187. 6 Wend. at 566.
188. 8 Wend. 47 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1831). Cf. Nichols v. Williams, 8 Cow. 13 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1827).
189. 8 Wend. at 64.
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time all determinations which were recorded under the head of certiorari,
both from regular judicial tribunals and from administrative bodies, became part of a small reservoir of case citations. This was later drawn
upon indiscriminately, irrespective of whether the particular case to which
it was applied involved a judicial or an administrative determination.
Like treatment was also accorded to statutory certiorari and common-law
certiorari, where the cases applied a rule laid down in earlier decisions
without distinction between statutory and common-law certiorari situations. Nonetheless, Patchen is a notable contribution to certiorari law in
extending judicial review to questions of fairness and regularity in the
procedures followed by tribunals of the first instance.
With LeRoy and Patchen opening wider areas for judicial review upon
certiorari, the supreme court was asked in 1837, in Birdsall v. Phillips,9 0
to review a verdict entered for a landlord in a summary eviction proceeding. It was noted that the court below had jurisdiction and had
proceeded regularly, leaving only the question of the merits for consideration on this review by statutory certiorari. The decision reverted to the
narrow interpretation of certiorari review, as the court ruled in regard to
the action of the lower court that: "If they go wrong on the evidence, it
is the misfortune of the parties. The object of the law is to give them a
final power over the merits upon the light class of litigation which it confides to them."'' The court then proceeded to meet the central issue
squarely, saying, "[T]he question upon the conclusive effect of the trial of
a jurisdictional fact involved in an issue joined"' 92 is for the lower court
and not for the supreme court, which otherwise might as well try the
suit in the first place.
Judge Cowen's interpretation of jurisdictional fact is not to be confused
with contemporary usage because he intended, citing Starr, that all the
facts confided to the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal should become
conclusive once decided by it, whereas today that phrase refers to those
mixed questions of law and fact under which the administrative body
acquires jurisdiction to act in the premises. 3 Although a statutory certiorari, the tenor of Birdsall v. Phillips left a strong impact upon succeeding decisions in the direction of narrowing the scope of review in commonlaw certiorari.
One of the leading certiorari cases of this period, Ex parte Mayor of
Albany,'94 in 1840, cut across many facets of administrative law, past
190. 17 Wend. 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837). See also Simpson v. Rhinelanders, 20 Wend
103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
191. 17 Wend. at 468.
192. Ibid.
193. Schwartz, An Introduction to American Administrative Law 213-17 (2d ed. 1962).
194. 23 Wend. 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
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and present, in rejecting a challenge to an assessment levied to defray
the cost of repairing a street in Albany. For one, the writ claimed that
the bylaws of the corporation, i.e., City of Albany, had been violated in
connection with the assessment and tax levy. The court answered that so
long as the state law was followed, it was immaterial that its own bylaws
were infringed, although the court did seek to mitigate this view by finding that the bylaws were in conflict with superior state law.
Another objection was founded upon the allegation that the local
commissioners had exceeded their authority in regard to the type of
expenses for which they could assess, the localities to be assessed, and the
rate of assessment applied to various types of property. Holding contrary
to and distinguishing LeRoy v. Mayor of New York, the court answered
that so long as they "acted upon persons and a subject-matter within their
jurisdiction, the proceeding is, in its nature, incapable of correction by
certiorari.'"-5 The century-long concept of certiorari was here again
clearly expressed, viz., having acted upon certain matters over which the
body was given jurisdiction, further judicial review was foreclosed and
there was no further recourse from the decision of that body.
The cases, both English and New York, were reviewed by the court as
it concluded that "we will not, in any case, on a common law certiorari,
go beyond the question of power, which is another word for jurisdiction . . .,," Such is the classic definition of the function of certiorari
for that period. In addition, the court seemed anxious to dispose of all
possible uncertainty in matters of certiorari, and it commended defendants for omitting evidence from their returns because: "We cannot look
into testimony on the merits, even where the return comes from a tribunal
bound to act upon the general law of evidence,"10 7 thereby issuing a
warning that prospective relators should harbor no illusion as to what can
be accomplished upon common-law certiorari review. It is not the function
of certiorari to meddle with matters of discretion or questions of fact, but

only to keep lesser bodies and officials within the jurisdiction assigned
to them.
Apparently the time was not yet ripe for more than perfunctory,
threshold review by common-law certiorari of the actions of lesser tribunals. It is possible that the degree of understanding necessary to cope
with all the strands of legal theory in certiorari had not been sufficiently
developed, or perhaps, there was a conscious and positive disinclination
to extend the reach and scope of judicial review because it would lay
too heavy a restraining hand upon the initiative of inferior bodies. The
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 281.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 288.
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supreme court, groping for a rule of review, had oscillated between the
liberal review of LeRoy v. Mayor of New York and the extreme handsoff position of Ex parte Mayor of Albany, both of which involved similar
questions on the scope of judicial review in regard to the exercise of
discretion in fixing assessments. Assessments for improvements was an
important area of controversy at that time because of the tremendous
growth taking place throughout the state. From a long-range standpoint,
the law benefited because both viewpoints were placed into the arena of
judicial evaluation and decision. The most serviceable technique, judged
by the needs and aspirations of the community, would ultimately emerge
as the ruling principle. At times, mere legal precedent did not loom as
important as the interests of justice and the supreme court did not hesitate to enter areas previously unknown to common-law certiorari. In
those instances, e.g., LeRoy v. Mayor of New York and Patchen, judicial
review was expanded and certiorari gained additional stature and substance.
With these cross-currents in the air, and in the same year as Ex parte
Mayor of Albany, 1840, another case testing the inclination of the
supreme court to review substantial questions of law upon certiorari arose.
This involved a highway which a jury of twelve had voted as necessary.
The commissioners of highways had refused to lay it out, and on appeal
to the judges of common pleas, the decision of the commissioners was
reversed. By common-law certiorari the question was brought to the
supreme court in People ex rel. Seward v. Judges of Dutchess.9l 8 The
major issue was whether the proposed road ran through an orchard, which
the law prohibited. Evidence on the existence of the orchard had been
excluded in the court below. The supreme court found nothing wrong in
the exclusion of the evidence because it "did not go to the jurisdiction of
the judges," presenting a perfect example of jurisdictional fact which the
court here eschewed examining. The language of the decision followed
the traditional rote that the court's supervisory power "only extends to
questions touching the jurisdiction of the subordinate tribunal, and the
regularity of its proceedings."' 9 The power, authority and jurisdiction
of common pleas to act (in an appellate administrative capacity) were
directly drawn into question by the issue of whether the highway ran
through an orchard, and this central issue should have been examined
and settled by the supreme court. Even under the most narrow concept
of reviewability at that time, the power of common pleas to act was
legally inhibited until the orchard issue was disposed of. It seems that
even where a case squarely presented the issue of jurisdiction to act, the
198. 23 Wend. 360 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).
199. Id. at 362.

MANDAMUS AND CERTIORARI

1964]

supposed province of judicial review, the supreme court sometimes
turned the question aside, falling back upon formula language to cloak
its omission. The plain desirability of opening the road must have overridden the niceties of legality, because this was Lawton v. Commissioners
0 revisited.
of Cambridge2
It remained for the court of errors to put at rest some of the uncertainty by reverting to an expanded version of the orthodox rule for review
by common-law certiorari. In a suit, Stone v. Mayor of New York, 20 '
brought up from the supreme court by the plaintiffs, it was alleged that
they were owners of personal property in buildings which had been
ordered destroyed by the Mayor of the City of New York in the great
fire of 1835 in order to arrest the spread of the conflagration. A statute
had provided for the payment of compensation to owners of buildings so
ordered destroyed, and plaintiffs' claim for the loss of goods in one such
building was sustained in common pleas but reversed in the supreme
court.
In a lengthy dissertation tracing the development of the law of certiorari, Senator Paige concluded that at present the writ possessed all the
characteristics of a writ of error. Therefore it only brought up the bare
record for review and did not reach the merits, the evidence at the trial,
nor the rulings of the judge. The court ruled that in the absence of a
statute prescribing the scope of review, the reviewing court "must restrict
itself to questions relating to the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal, the
regularity of its proceedings, and to questions of law which may arise on
the face of the record ... ."02 The court found that common pleas had

acted in excess of its jurisdiction in allowing damages against the city on
subject matter not within the contemplation of the statute. The court
ruled that it was such an exercise of excess jurisdiction as would appear
on the face of the record coming up for review. The supreme court was
therefore held to have been correct in reversing the lower court. Thus,
within the space of a few years, the issue of jurisdiction became a hotly
contested question to which the courts were now compelled to give greater
consideration, even though cases like the Judges of Dutchess and Ex parte
Mayor of Albany did not wholly measure up to the new trend appearing
in the opinions of the supreme court. The trend, it should be noted, was
not always clear nor was it uniform, but under Stone v. Mayor of New
York, in addition to jurisdiction, regularity and questions of law became
the proper objects of judicial scrutiny by certiorari.
In another case where the law of certiorari was exhaustively examined,
200.
201.

2 Cai. R. 179 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
25 Wend. 157 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1840).

202. Id. at 170.
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Niblo v. Post's Adm'rs20 also in 1840, this time by Wendell, the official
state reporter who appeared for the plaintiff, the court of errors was again
called upon to explicate the practical application of the writ. The opinion
is notable not for the decision ultimately reached by the court but for the
pains taken by Wendell in reviewing all of the principal cases on the
subject of statutory and common-law certiorari. Wendell's exegesis is
most important because he placed on record the wide extent to which
"the exercise of judicial powers affecting the interests of the citizen in
matters of utmost consequence" were then proceeding in a mode unknown to the common law, a cry echoed in our own generation.
Wendell conceded that lately the supreme court had not acted to review
errors of law and of fact arising in proceedings from such inferior tribunals and he urged that the error of every tribunal ought to be the
subject of review and correction at some other place at least once. Although he acknowledged the need for these inferior tribunals which bring
speedy and inexpensive justice to the citizen, he pleaded that rights
should not be adjudicated without evidence, against evidence, or contrary
to law. He argued against a blind adherence to legal precedent and
showed the need
insisted that a review of the history of the writ clearly
204
for a revision of the practices theretofore followed.
It should be recognized that the evidence was considered in the Niblo
case, not by reason of Wendell's erudite showing, but because it was a
statutory certiorari on a summary proceeding to recover possession of
property. Years later, the fact that examination of the evidence was
undertaken in the case because it was authorized in such a statutory
certiorari would become blurred by the passage of time, and the Niblo
case came to be cited for the simple proposition that evidence could be
examined by the supreme court upon review by certiorari.
Confusion was soon again added to the problem of judicial review by
certiorari because of assessment litigation in People ex rel. Agnew v.
Mayor of New York2 °* and In the Matter o] Mount Morris Square,'00
which questioned local improvement proceedings undertaken by municipal
bodies exercising executive, legislative, ministerial and judicial powers.
Attack by certiorari seems to have been frequently employed as a method
of challenging an assessment for a public improvement. The court in the
Agnew case doubted whether such assessments should be removed into
the supreme court at all because certiorari review would only examine
the record to see whether the body "has kept within the limits of its
203.

25 Wend. 280 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1840).

See also Anderson v. Prindle, 23 Wend.

616, 618 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1840).

204.
205.
206.

25 Wend. at 285-87 (argument of counsel).
2 Hill 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
2 Hill 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
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jurisdiction; but we cannot look beyond it for the purpose of a review on
the merits." 207 This completes the cycle running through Starr and Ex
parte Mayor of Albany, and constitutes a complete reversal of LeRoy v.
Mayor of New York. The court indicated impatience with the efforts of
taxpayers who seek to impede or to halt needed public improvements by
invoking the alleged omission of some technical requirement of the law.
Consequently, a rather dim view of reviewability on certiorari was taken
in these two important cases and this attitude left a lasting impression
on the course of certiorari law during the next several decades.
Under the new constitution which went into effect on July 1, 1847, a
major judicial change was the replacement of the ineffectual, unwieldy
court of errors by the court of appeals, allowing a compact body of experienced judges to formulate definitive rules of law.
A new wind was now blowing and all at once, in two cases, the longtime rule of Lawton that the jurisdiction of inferior tribunals and officers
would be presumed was swept aside by the supreme court. " ' The new
court of appeals also embarked upon taking a fresh look at the problem
of scope of review in certiorari, albeit obliquely, at first. In the frequently
recurring summary proceeding situation, it seized the opportunity to
push the door open wider on judicial examination of the evidence relating
to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to act in matters presented to it.2 ° This
was upon statutory certiorari and there was respectable authority in the
recent cases for taking a more liberal position.
A major step in dispelling the clouds of doubt which hung over
common-law certiorari review was taken in People cx rel. Bodine v.
Goodwin,210 where referees appointed by the county court had overruled
commissioners of highways, and ordered that a certain road be laid out
and opened. This determination was taken to the supreme court by
certiorari and was there reversed, the referees appealing to the court of
appeals. At the outset, the court of appeals noted that the pertinent
statute prohibited the laying out of a road through any building without
the consent of the owner. In the present case, unless the owner's consent
had been obtained in regard to a barn which lay athwart the proposed
road the "proceedings were void for want of jurisdiction.

2 1'

This was a

207. 2 Hill at 11.
208. Harrington v. People, 6 Barb. 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849); Prosser v. Secor, S Barb.
607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849). See also People ex rel. Akin v. Morgan, SS N.Y. S87, 590 (1874).
209. Benjamin v. Benjamin, 5 N.Y. 383, 387 (1851). Compare Morewood v. Hollister,
6 N.Y. 309 (1852), with People ex rel. Griffin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 441
(1851).
210. 5 N.Y. 568 (1851). See Jaffe, judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional
Fact, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 953, 964-66 (1957).
211. 5 N.Y. at 572.
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plain reversal of the Judges of Dutchess case. 12 The court then laid it
down as a rule for inferior bodies that the return made by them
must shew affirmatively that they had authority to act; and where, as in the present
case, their authority and jurisdiction depends upon a fact to be proved before themselves, and such fact be disputed, the magistrate must certify the proofs given in
of enabling the higher court to determine whether
relation to it, for the 21
purpose
3
the fact be established.
Where prior decisions of the old supreme court had barely inched along
the road toward taking cognizance of jurisdictional fact, by analogies
drawn from statutory certiorari under which review on the merits was
often authorized, the new court of appeals now took the more advanced
position that proof of jurisdictional fact was essential to enable the
inferior body to exercise its power at all. The court noted, however, that
"the decision of the magistrate in relation to all other facts is final and
' 4
conclusive, and will not be reviewed on a common law certiorari."
Although this was a common-law certiorari, the proceedings complained
of, those of the referees, were of a judicial body and the more liberal
rules applicable to judicial bodies, allowing wide latitude on decisions of
fact, were here applied.
In this case it was determined that the evidence pertaining to the
consent of the owner of the barn was properly included in the return and
was examinable by the reviewing court. A valid consent not having been
shown, the judgment of the supreme court was affirmed. Apparently
Wendell's scholarly demonstration in Niblo had not been without effect.
New concepts in common-law certiorari review could henceforth be
forged now that the shackles of nominal review on jurisdiction and regularity were beginning to buckle under the pressure of a more realistic
understanding of the important activities carried on by the lesser tribunals, and of the fact that substance had been sacrificed to form in confining judicial review to formal questions of jurisdiction and regularity
alone.
In the meantime, the supreme court, through its newly created general term, comprising three judges, continued to grapple with the
day-to-day intricacies of certiorari. A notable decision involving a question of alleged bastardy held that, despite the inability of the court to
review erroneous decisions made by an inferior body in receiving or
rejecting evidence, if there was "no evidence legally tending to establish
the main facts which could alone authorize the judgment," the court
would set it aside.2 15 Although this occurred upon certiorari review of a
212.

23 Wend. 360 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840).

213. 5 N.Y. at 572.
214. Ibid.
215. People ex rel. Crandall v. Overseers of the Poor, 15 Barb, 286, 293 (N.Y. Sup.
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lower judicial tribunal, it was nevertheless another long step away from
the narrow constraints of the old jurisdiction rule. It resulted primarily
from the mother's testimony that her husband was out of the State for
two years prior to the birth of the child which the relator was alleged
to have fathered. Relying upon People ex rel. Bodine v. Goodwin,21 the
court ruled that it "'does not deliberate upon the weight and just force
of evidence, but determines merely whether there is any evidence
whatever.

'

211

The mother's hearsay evidence regarding the husband's

whereabouts was ruled to be the equivalent of no evidence, and the
order of filiation was reversed. This decision confirmed that the scope of
review was now enlarged beyond the confines of mere jurisdiction, and
was the forerunner of the rule that in a quasi-judicial proceeding there
must be competent proof of the facts upon which the determination is
based."'
However, the back-and-forth process was resumed again with a decision of general term where an assessment for a public improvement was
challenged on the ground that a majority of the owners involved had
not filed the required petition.2 19 The court said it would accord a presumption of regularity to the acts of the city council, treating them as
conclusive; also, common-law certiorari did not "review erroneous legal
decisions of inferior tribunals, '2 2 9 and "'only where there is a total want
of evidence upon some essential point' ,221 or "an entire and palpable
absence of all evidence tending to confer jurisdiction"2 - will the supreme
court act. If the action of the council had not been stamped conclusive, and had the entire tone of the opinion not evinced a purely
formal review, there would have been some saving grace in the last two
quoted portions of the opinion which were properly concerned with the
problems of evidence and of jurisdiction. The prior recent cases were
supported in theory but in actuality the proceedings taken by the council
were entirely confirmed. Most likely this was on the unarticulated
Ct. 1853). See People ex rel. Shipman v. Overseers of the Poor, 6 How. Pr. 25 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct. 1851), to the effect that rulings on receipt or rejection of evidence will not
be considered on common-law certiorari.
216. 5 N.Y. 568 (1851).
217. 15 Barb. at 293.
218. See People ex rel. Haines v. Smith, 45 N.Y. 772, 777 (1871) and the early statutory certiorari case of Nicoll v. Dunlap, 2 Johns. R. 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (per
curiam), to the same effect.
219. People ex rel. Porter v. City of Rochester, 21 Barb. 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856).
See also People ex rel. Huntting v. Commissioners of Highmays, 30 N.Y. 72, 76 (1364);
Roach v. Cosine, 9 Wend. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832).

220. 21 Barb. at 670.
221.

Id. at 671.

222.

Id. at 672.
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ground of the superior public interest involved, eschewing inquiry into
the very matters which the court itself said should be examined.
The tortuous road pursued by common-law certiorari from Lawton in
1804 to 1860 is traced with great care and skill in a case of common-law
certiorari, People ex rel. Van Rensselaer v. Van Alstyne, 2 8 brought to
review a reversal of the refusal of highway commissioners to lay out a
road. Judge Hogeboom exhaustively cited all of the leading cases and
reviewed their holdings. He then noted the current rule that
the facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are open to review .... [T]helr

decision is not conclusive. Otherwise they may exercise arbitrary power, decide
judicially that the case is within their jurisdiction, and bid defiance to the superior
court. . . .Hence the evidence touching those facts must be returned [to allow
it came to a right conclusion upon
the supreme court to determine] . . . whether
2 24
the facts which gave it the power to act.
All the facts which would tend to show whether the proposed highway
would become a public road by reason of its prior use, whether it was
closed at one end or not, "and generally how and in what manner it has
been laid out and used, must be regarded as legitimate evidence before
the referees, upon a jurisdictional question, and probably reviewable on
certiorari. 2 25 Questions of discretion, such as the benefit or utility of the
road, the extent of possible use, and the like, involved the merits which
were not reviewable. But for the first time, a court required that a "right
conclusion" by an administrative body means that a factual basis must
exist in the record which a reviewing court can legally accept. Accordingly, a further return by the referees in regard to the jurisdictional
facts referred to was ordered by the court. This opinion is notable also
for its casebook manner of tracing the evolution of certiorari and
laying down its currently "accepted principles in the simplest possible
terms. Matters of discretion are not taken away from the inferior body
by review upon certiorari, but questions of law will be examined, and
questions of fact which impinge upon the body's power to act must be
shown in the return to enable the court to determine whether the evidence
legally supported the action taken below.
The landmark opinion bringing to a culmination the recent cases which
had successively expanded the scope of review on certiorari is People
ex rel. Cook v. Board of Police.220 There Judge Woodruff undertook a
canvass of the legal authorities on certiorari which is the equal of
Wendell in Niblo and of Justice Hogeboom in the Van Alstyne case, in an
223. 32 Barb. 131 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860), aff'd, 3 Key. (42* N.Y.) 35 (1866).
224. 32 Barb. at 135.
225. Id. at 137.
226. 39 N.Y. 506 (1868). See also People ex rel. Citizens' Gas-Light Co. v. Board of
Assessors, 39 N.Y. 81, 88 (1868); Mullins v. People, 24 N.Y. 399, 403 (1862).
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effort to bring order out of the welter of cases exhibiting diverse doctrine.
The Cook case involved a member of the police force in the New York
metropolitan area who ivas fined for being absent without leave. The
absence consisted of that period of time during which he was under
dismissal by the Board of Police and engaged in litigation with them,
ultimately securing a decision in his favor. General term had affirmed
an order of special term which annulled the police board's decision
fining relator for the period he remained away from duty pursuant to
the police board's very own order.
At the outset, the court clearly recognized and aptly stated the proposition which had to be resolved: "[M]ay the court, on a common law
certiorari, go beyond the inquiry, whether the inferior tribunal had
jurisdiction, and was the proceeding and judgment within that jurisdiction?"" 7 Defendants contended: "[J] urisdiction appearing, and the judgment being within that jurisdiction, the judgment is to be deemed, on this
certiorari,conclusive.

22

8

Defendants also contended that only the record

of the proceeding below was brought up and not the evidence, so that
the circumstances of a particular case and the evidence thereon "does
not enlarge the field of review, 9 or bring any other than jurisdictional
questions under examination."0

The court itself then embarked upon an examination of the leading
cases, noting that the earlier decisions expressed strong views in favor
of narrow judicial review, even to the extent that acknowledged errors
by inferior tribunals were ruled to be outside the scope of judicial review.
Wendel's diligent effort in Niblo was duly noted, together with the holding of the court of errors there that under both common-law and statutory certiorari, all errors of law and questions on the merits were correctable on judicial review by certiorari.
The court conceded that "in all the cases it is clear that the decision
of a mere question of fact upon the weight of the evidence, cannot be
reviewed." ' The court examined the ambivalent line of certiorari decisions in search of a rule for resolving the problems of the case at hand.
It was forced to conclude that "it would be idle to attempt to harmonize
the various decisions and dicta above referred to."2' However, it
readily acknowledged that a more liberal view of the office of commonlaw certiorari has appeared in the "later cases, '" 23- a portent of the
direction which the decision would take.
227.

39 N.Y. at 508.

228.

Id. at 509.

229.

Ibid.

230. Id- at 512.
231.

Id. at 516.

232.

Ibid.
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Consequently the court of appeals was constrained to reach into new
territory if it was to administer justice proIerly as the supervising
tribunal in regard to "powers . ..which affect valuable rights both of
person and property ....
It feared that once such inferior determina-

tions were given the stamp of finality without restraint, "there is
danger that much of injustice and wrong may happen without possibility of redress.

' 234

This century-old passage has a ring of con-

temporary urgency.
Judge Woodruff wisely recognized that it was not simple nor easy to
lay down a formula which would reconcile the rival interests of the
citizen and the government in such cases. To the government-the
police board here-his opinion accordingly yields finality for
conclusions of fact upon conflicting evidence and matters of mere detail, in the
order or mode of proceeding, not violating any rule of law to the prejudice of the
party, and matters which are clearly submitted to the judgment or discretion of the
inferior tribunal, where the evidence presents a case for its exercise .... 285
From the standpoint of the citizen, and of this relator in particular, the
court would determine by an examination of "the case upon the whole
of the evidence, to see whether, as a matter of law, there was any proof
which could warrant a conviction of the relator,

23

and "if the case

was such at the close of the trial that it would have been erroneous to
submit the question to the jury . .. then the error is an error in law,

and the conviction was illegal; it rests upon no finding of facts upon
evidence tending to sustain such finding ....,,237
Having thus afforded himself full access to the facts of the case, Judge
Woodruff, for the court, decided that the conduct of relator in remaining
away from his job as policeman for a period of 439 days at the very
request and order of defendants, pending outcome of the litigation
on the validity of his ouster, did not constitute such neglect of duty
within a "sensible" meaning of the charge.
Although the court made a valiant effort, which ultimately succeeded,
to set the house of certiorari in order, the most valuable parts of the
opinion were dicta because the grounds of the decision were matters
recited in the application and return, requiring no evaluation of the nature
or weight of the evidence to achieve the result announced. It was a pure
question of law, viz., that relator's absence having been required by de233. Id. at 517.
234. Ibid.
235. Ibid. See People ex rel. Clapp v. Board of Police, 72 N.Y. 415, 417 (1878), where
the court also determined that the evidence had no relevance to and did not support
the charge against relator.
236. 39 N.Y. at 518.
237. Ibid.
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fendants themselves, the absence could not constitute a proper legal
basis for the charge of neglect of duty. It seems that the court decided
that the time had finally come to stabilize the law of certiorari in terms
of realistic review, and seized this occasion to spell out the ground rules
in detail. There was, from the standpoint of present perspective, an
unbelievable fortuity in the intermittent backward and forward movement of this phase of certiorari law which ultimately allowed the
court to make the best choice by weighing the practices, procedures,
rules and policies enunciated over several generations. The legislature,
too, deserves praise for refraining from interference by statutory correctives during this extended "shakedown" period.
It was now established that the mode of the common law was to be
followed as a general guideline for the conduct of judicial-type proceedings by inferior tribunals and officials, but the methods of common-law
trial practice need not be slavishly imitated.
At least two standards pronounced in the Board of Police case were
later imported into the practice codes, viz., where a rule of law is violated
to the prejudice of a party"' and the test for weighing evidence-as, for
example, the quantum of proof which, in a jury case, would require
setting aside a verdict. 13 9 The judicial analogy was derived from the
circumstance that many certiorari actions were in review of inferior
judicial tribunals not of record so that the practice of assimilating other
judicial requirements to such proceedings came easily to mind and they
were therefore quite readily made applicable. Although the decision was
an authoritative break with the past in several respects, the basis for
the adoption of the principles enunciated in the case had been set forth
in court decisions beginning with LeRoy v. Mayor of New York in 1823.
A large measure of certainty and stability had now been brought to the
law of certiorari in the area of scope of review. The new standard for
judging the validity of administrative action of a judicial nature was
soon incorporated into the certiorari article of the 1880 Code of Civil
Procedure. This constituted the first codification of certiorari law after
a period of one hundred years of common-law practice drawn largely,
especially in the first decades, from scattered early English precedents.
The rules which are followed today were first firmly established a century
ago after conflicting concepts of judicial review had been rigorously
tested out in the general terms of the supreme court and in the court of
appeals.
III.

JuDIcl DisCRETION IN GRANTING CERTIORARI

In the first days of certiorari, when an alternative writ was initially
issued to require defendant to make a return of the matters complained of,
238. N.Y. Code Civ. P. § 2140(3) (1880).
239. N.Y. Code Civ. P. § 2140(5) (1880).
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it was not uncommon for the court to refuse to issue the alternative writ
altogether. It was reasoned in one of the leading cases on this subject,
People ex rel. Church v. Supervisors of the County of Allegany,2"' in
1836, that the official bodies or persons whose acts were under attack
had exercised "powers in which the people at large are concerned, and
great public detriment or inconvenience might result from interfering
with their proceedings.

2 41

This was a new and important distinction

borrowed in part from mandamus law where the court also exercised a
discretion in its issuance. It holds that official acts of a general nature
and application usually will not be inhibited by certiorari unless specific
individual damage could be shown. In the Allegany case, assessment rates
and taxes were requested to be returned upon relator's claim that the
supervisors erred in auditing certain charges against the county. The
court called this a "trifle," indicating that mere error alone is not sufficient because "the public interest and inconveience [sic] may be taken
into the account in guiding the discretion of the court, 2 42 and thereupon
quashed the writ. This was the forerunner of the basic rule later made
applicable to taxpayer actions.
Property interests which are personal to a citizen and which involve his
particular situation alone are on a far different footing from those which
he shares as a taxpayer in common with all other taxpayers. In the
former case, judicial discretion would most likely be exercised favorably
to the relator, in the latter case it usually would not. Later cases,
recognizing that individual grievances can arise from assessment proceedings, did modify the broad restriction imposed by Allegany in order
to provide relief in individual tax assessment matters, treating the determination made in regard to the amount and
the validity of such tax as a
2 43
judicial matter subject to certiorari review

In one of the leading cases, People ex rel. Agnew v. Mayor of New
York,244 exemplifying the negative judicial attitude towards issuing
certiorari where matters of great public concern were involved, the
supreme court said:
The allowance of the writ rests in the sound discretion of the court, and it has
often been denied where the power to issue it was unquestionable, and where there
2 45
was apparent error in the proceedings to be reviewed.
240.

15 Wend. 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).

241.

Id. at 206.

242.

Id. at 209.

243. E.g., Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 117, 119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846); People ex
rel. Western R.R. v. Board of Assessors, 40 N.Y. 154 (1869).
244.

2 Hill 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841), in regard to an assessment for a new sewer.

245.

Id. at 12.
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This is an extraordinary concession that the law will not reach out via
certiorari to correct any and all errors committed by lesser official bodies.
But full examination of the circumstances in the Agnew case reveals that
trifling errors had been seized upon by meddlesome taxpayers in an effort
to bring a halt to much needed public improvements. The court expressed
doubt that assessments for city improvements should be removed into
the supreme court by certiorari because the public inconvenience may
"greatly outweigh the importance of correcting some legal, though,
perhaps, not very grievous error in the proceedings."'24
The assessment for the opening of Mount Morris Square in New York
City presented some of the same questions as the last previous case, and
the court again did not mince its language in indicating that certiorari
will not be allowed to issue "where assessments of taxes or awards of
damages are in question, which affect any considerable number of
persons. 247 Of additional importance in the denial of the writ was the
court's view that the action complained of was not judicial and therefore
certiorari would not lie to review it.
In a later case which discussed the principles set forth in these two
important cases, the further rule was laid down that certiorari must be
"essential to prevent some substantial injury to the applicant"2 48 and
should not at the same time be an excessive burden to the public interest
in regard to some mere technical objection.240 The court seemed to be
seeking to preserve a proper balance between private right and public
interest in exercising its discretion in such cases.
IV.

FINALITY AND NONREVIEWABLE ACTION

The Lawton case, the grandfather decision of New York certiorari
jurisprudence, promulgated several fundamental principles in this branch
of the law, some of which have already been noted. In the face of a
statutory provision which stated that upon an appeal to the judges of
common pleas from decisions of highway commissioners, the judges'
decision should be conclusive in the premises, 00 Judge Spencer pro246. Id. at 13.
247. In the Matter of Mount Morris Square, 2 Hill 14, 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). See
also People ex rel. Porter v. City of Rochester, 21 Barb. 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1856);
Elmendorf v. Mayor of City of New York, 25 Wend. 693 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
248. People ex rel. Moore v. Mayor of City of New York, 5 Barb. 43, 49 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1848).
249. Ibid.
250. Lawton v. Commissioners of Cambridge, 2 Cai. R. 179, 181-82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1804). Compare Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 33 N.Y. 375, 381-82 (1866), with People
ex rel. Schuylerville & U.M.R.R. v. Betts, 55 N.Y. 600, 603 (1874).
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nounced the rule which, with some variations, has remained to this day.
Where the property or rights of a citizen are involved, even though the
statute makes the action final, the supreme court will nevertheless
exercise its common-law jurisdiction to supervise and review the actions
of inferior tribunals in regard to jurisdiction and regularity. At a time
when great uncertainty prevailed in the law because it was new and
untried under native conditions, and notwithstanding the stamp of
finality placed upon the administrative action of common pleas by the
legislature, Judge Spencer clearly perceived the need to lay some measure
of restraint upon these lesser bodies and he did not hesitate to act in
imposing it.
Invoking certiorari to review various aspects of governmental action
had apparently become widespread towards the middle nineteenth century, because the supreme court was compelled to emphasize that certiorari only extended to "inferior courts and officers who exercise judicial
powers."2 5' This was the first definitive expression that unless the matter
sought to be reviewed was of a judicial nature, certiorari would not be
allowed. These suits involved public work improvements which taxpayers were seeking to block by raising a host of technicalities. The
questions raised were not adjudicated by the court, which ruled that
matters "legislative, executive or ministerial," were not the proper objects
of certiorari review and refused to award any relief to the plaintiffs.
A more precise definition of the functions of a municipal corporation
had to be formulated where certiorari was again resorted to in regard to
the construction of a public sewer. Relators complained that certain
procedural matters mandated by a statute had not been followed by the
2 2
City of New York in regard to the award of the contract for the work. 1
Defendants naturally cited the ruling in the Mount Morris Square case
in order to have the certiorari quashed on the ground of nonreviewable
action. The court distinguished the action of defendants in adopting the
ordinance and awarding the construction contract as involving "a question
of expediency, solely for their cohsideration, and which cannot be
reviewed here,"2 3 from the action taken to confirm the assessment, which
was deemed judicial because it decided "on the property or rights of the
251. People ex rel. Agnew v. Mayor of New York, 2 Hill 9, 11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
See also In the Matter of Mount Morris Square, 2 Hill 14, 20-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841);
Pearsall v. Commissioners of Highways, 17 Wend. 15, 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837); Pugsley v.
Anderson, 3 Wend. 468, 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
252. People ex rel. Moore v. Mayor of City of New York, 5 Barb. 43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1848).
253.

Id. at 45.
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citizen."25' 4 In the latter instance, where action was found to be "substantially erroneous," it could be vacated by the court. Therefore, where
a specific, individual injustice arose affecting the property or rights of a
citizen, the court would entertain certiorari. Cases such as the Moorc
decision represent the small steps taken towards defining the nature of
judicial action which is, properly speaking, the only action subject to
review by certiorari.
It remained for a later case,- 5 in which bonuses to Civil War enlistees
were challenged, to mark out in the plainest terms the limits of certiorari
jurisdiction. General term stated:
The office of the writ of certiorari is to bring up for review in the superior court
the record of an inferior court or of a tribunal exercising judicial functions. It is
not the office of the writ to bring up the proceedings of any other bodies or classes
of public officers. Courts are instituted to decide judicial questions, and superior
courts review the record and proceedings of inferior courts, or of officers or tribunals acting in a judicial capacity, and in no other.250
To sustain the writ, there has been quite a tendency to enlarge the sphere of judicial
acts, and to regard almost every kind of official act requiring or involving the exercise of judgment or discretion as a judicial act. But this, I think, is a mistake. There is
scarcely an act of any public officer or body, or of persons clothed with special powers
by or under the authority of law, that does not require and involve more or less
discretion. It is simply absurd to call all such acts judicial, and apply to them the
principles which govern the review of the proceedings of courts and of judicial
officers.257

This decision represents a long-overdue criticism of the tendency of

some mid-nineteenth century courts to label many activities of officers and
tribunals as judicial in order to bring them within the ambit of certiorari
review. Although the court made it clear that only judicial acts were
to be reviewed upon certiorari, which was now being returned to its more
traditional function, the nature of a "judicial act" was nevertheless left
unanswered in the opinion, and in the years following very little was
added to clarify the nature of judicial action in this regard. Perhaps it
was best left indefinite and therefore in a flexible state to respond to new
and unforeseen needs. In any event, the quaint complaint of another general term panel that "we have been called upon on repeated occasions to
take from the common council of Rochester the powers and duties im254.

Ibid.

255. People ex rel. Dickinson v. Board of Supervisors, 43 Barb. 232 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1864), aff'd, 34 N.Y. 516 (1866).
256. 43 Barb. at 234.
257. Id.at 237. See generally Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 Pol. Sci. Q. 493,
506-14 (1891).
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posed upon them by the city charter and assume them ourselves"2 58
would arise less frequently thereafter upon certiorari to review.
V.

FINAL DETERMINATION AND REVIEWABILITY

Closely involved with "nonreviewable action" is the rule that the
action sought to be reviewed must be in a final form before the judicial
department is asked to act upon it. The reason for this requirement was
clearly set forth in an early case where defendant sought to have eviction
proceedings removed from common pleas to the supreme court by
certiorari. The court said that if the case were removed before there had
been an order, judgment or trial in the lower court, "the superior tribunal
would assume an original jurisdiction, instead of a power to review and
correct." 9 The argument for requiring a final determination could not
have been stated more plainly. Consequently, it soon became established
as a firm rule of certiorari law, leaving only the details to be worked out
in the later cases. °

VI.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIvE REMEDIES

It is interesting to discover how many basic principles of certiorari
law were postulated quite early in our legal history. One early system of
appellate administrative review, which is at present functioning extensively, came up for consideration in a suit brought against school district
trustees. Certiorari was sought in order to have the tax lists and assessment rolls returned upon the ground that the requirements of a statute
governing school construction had not been followed. 20 ' The court ruled
that a party aggrieved by the action of the school trustees must, according to the statute, first appeal to the commissioner of common schools
of the town, and it accordingly quashed the certiorari.
A somewhat similar statutory provision, which allowed an aggrieved
party to seek a rehearing after an adverse decision, was likewise the
basis for denying certiorari review in another case. There relator, a harbor
pilot, had been suspended by the commissioners of pilots and his applica258. People ex rel. Butts v. Common Council of City of Rochester, 5 Lans. 142, 144
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871). See also People ex rel. Corwin v. Walter, 68 N.Y. 403, 410 (1877);
People ex rel. Savage v. Board of Health, 20 How. Pr. 458, 460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1861).
259. Lynde v. Noble, 20 Johns. R. 80, 83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
260. People ex rel. Gilmore v. Donohue, 22 Hun 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880); People ex
rel. Nichols v. Cooper, 21 Hun 517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1880).
261. Storm v. Odell, 2 Wend. 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829). See also People ex rel.
Tompkins v. Landreth, 1 Hun 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874); Finch v. Cleveland, 10 Barb.
290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851); Ex parte Mayor of Albany, 23 Wend. 277, 283 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1840).
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tion for certiorari was denied because of his failure to pursue the administrative remedy prescribed by statute.2 12 These rulings later found
their way into the statutory codification of the writ of certiorari. -e
VII. STANDING

This area of prerogative law has proven troublesome through the years
and the first decisions reflect an inability to lay out the limits of personal
interest with sufficient clarity for guidance as to when certiorari is to be
allowed. In a leading case referred to earlier in connection with scope
of review,20 4 the court adopted a lenient attitude toward a taxpayer who
questioned the validity of a public improvement because the statute was
infringed. However, a party without a separate, individual interest in a
matter was not permitted to sue out certiorari in most early cases.
Although the cases of People ex rel. Agnew v. Mayor of New York and
In the Matter of Mount Morris Square support this proposition in the
strongest possible terms, the opinions were clothed in generalities and did
not specifically rest the decision to deny certiorari on the absence of
265
standing.
The rationale for denying certiorari to many would-be keepers of
the public weal was expressed most clearly in the Supervisors of Allegany
case where the court said: "The reason is, that these bodies exercise
powers in which the people at large are concerned, and great public
detriment or inconvenience might result from interfering with their proceedings. 2 60 The court thereby touched upon a factor of great importance
in all litigation against government bodies, involving as it does the
interests of the public, which may often militate against allowing the
writ to issue even in a proper case. The writ will then be denied in the
exercise of the court's discretion.
This line of thought, however, was rejected by general term on an
appeal taken by a taxpayer from an order at special term which had
superseded his writ of certiorari.20- 7 He sought to review and set aside
certain items of tax claimed to have been illegally included in the tax
262.

People ex rel. Noble v. Board of Comm'rs, 37 Barb. 126 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1862).
N.Y. Code Civ. P. § 2122 (1880).
Starr v. Trustees of the Village of Rochester, 6 Wend. 564, 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1831).
265. See also People ex rel. Lawrence v. Schell, 5 Lans. 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872);
Starkweather v. Seeley, 45 Barb. 164 (N.Y. Sup. CL. 1865); People ex rel. Finch v.
Overseers of the Poor, 44 Barb. 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865); Colden v. Botts, 12 Wend. 234
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834). But see People ex rel. Lord v. Robertson, 26 How. Pr. 90, 93
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863).
266. 15 Wend. 198, 206 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836).
267. People ex rel. Haskin v. Board of Supervisors, 57 Barb. 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1870).
263.
264.
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levied for the town of West Farms. In the lower court, the certiorari was
quashed on the ground that a mere taxpayer had no standing to raise
such nonpersonal questions in a certiorari suit. General term considered
several adverse court of appeals decisions and concluded that the result in
those cases had hinged upon the fact that the suits were in equity and
there had been no showing that some branch of equity jurisprudence was
involved. Here, the prerogative suit was brought in behalf of the community, and relator was acting for the benefit of the inhabitants of a political subdivision in a matter where all had a common interest. Because the
people were actually plaintiffs, "it is not of vital importance who the
relator should be ....

If the people's writ of certiorarican be brought in

requisition to correct an error, where the interest of one individual is
injuriously affected, there can be no sound reason why it cannot be invoked when the rights of a community are invaded."2 8 These observations
completely overlooked the origin and purpose of the prerogative writ
of certiorari, which always related to the interest of an individual and was
only brought in the name of the people because the forms and practices
of the English writ, brought in the name of the king, were fully carried
over into New York practice.
Consequently, by means of a verbal technique which used a clever
syllogism whereby the people became parties in interest, the court was
able to modify the rule as to standing. This position was substantially
supported in a later taxpayer action in the court of appeals, 0 9 although a
contrary view had been earlier expressed on the point. 7 0 Ultimately, the
need for this type of action became generally evident and a taxpayer
proceeding became sanctioned by statute.2
VIII. NOTICE AND HEARING
The basic requirement that a party is entitled to notice and hearing in
a cause which affects his property or rights was likewise pronounced
early. An adverse determination of commissioners of highways was appealed to common pleas and there reversed. On certiorari, the supreme
court ruled that the failure to notify the commissioners of the appeal and
afford them an opportunity to be heard was indispensable to any judicial
272
action, and the determination was accordingly reversed.
268. Id. at 379-80.
269. People ex rel. Akin v. Morgan, 55 N.Y. 587, 591 (1874), reversing 65 Barb.
473, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1873).
270. People ex rel. Dickinson v. Board of Supervisors, 34 N.Y. 516, 517 (1866);
cf. People ex rel. Sheridan v. Andrews, 52 N.Y. 445 (1873).
271. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1881, ch. 531; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1872, ch. 161. See Ayers v.
Lawrence, 59 N.Y. 192 (1874), for an early statutory taxpayer's suit.
272. Commissioners of Highways v. Claw, 15 Johns. R. 537, 538 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818).
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Ultimately, in a case which generated a considerable amount of interest,
the requirements of law in regard to notice and hearing at the administrative level were spelled out in fine detail. It was the case of a police commissioner removed by the Mayor of the City of New York on charges of
incompetence, and relator's complaint that he had been denied notice and
hearing had been sustained by the general term on the opinion delivered
at special term.27 3 In this instance, the court noted that there was no
specific statement of charges, aid of counsel was denied, proofs against
relator were received while he was not present, nor was he informed of the
nature thereof; no opportunity to produce witnesses was given, except to
appear and to disprove the charges brought against him. In explaining
why the removal action was defective for lack of proper notice and
hearing, the court said:
"[O]pportunity to be heard" . . . involves... a definite and specific statement of the
charge, a reasonable time to answer it, the right to hear and examine the evidence
by which it is attempted to be sustained, to produce testimohy to show
its falsity,
274
and the aid and advice of counsel in the conduct of the examination.

The conduct of an administrative hearing affecting the property or
rights of a citizen would thenceforth be closely assimilated to the
procedures followed in a court of law in regard to proper notice and
fair hearing.
IX. DE Novo PROOF

Judicial analogies were also utilized in another case to reject the receipt
of additional evidence by a reviewing body where the lower body had
acted in a judicial capacity. The decision established that judicial review
of the action of an inferior body pursuant to certiorari is not to be a
rehash trial of the issues, but is in the nature of an appellate proceeding
to correct errors which have occurred below. 27 As explained by a later
court, "It is not the policy of the law to allow a party to participate in
such a proceeding, omit to take proper objections or raise legal questions
and seek redress by certiorari. 27 6 In other words, just as was established
See also Fonda v. Canal Appraisers, 1 Wend. 288 (N.Y.

Sup. Ct.

1828).

Common

pleas, in this type of case, functioned as a body of administrative appeal and not in its
common-law capacity.
273.

People ex rel. Nichols v. Mayor of City of New York, 19 Hun 441 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. 1879).
274. Id. at 449-50.

275. Sweet v. Overseers of the Poor, 3 Johns. R. 23 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1808). See
also People ex rel. Corwin v. Walter, 68 N.Y. 403, 408 (1877); In the Matter of Dover St.,
1 Cow. 74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (per curiam).

276. People v. Carrington, 2 Lans. 368, 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869).
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in mandamus procedure, a party, by design or otherwise, cannot gamble
on the determination of an inferior body in omitting proof or not raising
timely legal questions and then, if the determination is adverse, seek to
turn the scales by an additional submission.
X. FINDINGS; INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE
In an early statutory certiorari, the court of errors, in remarking upon
several errors committed in common pleas upon an appeal from the
justice court, also noted that it was an error of law to reverse the lower
court without giving any reasons.2 77 This was not strongly emphasized
at that time, but there was a tentative indication that judicial action subject to review by certiorari would require a statement of the reason for
the action taken.
In another matter governed by statute and again involving certiorari,
the state canal board, in reversing or modifying an award, was required
to state the ground' for the reversal or modification. Where it failed to
do so, general term set the action
aside, ruling it an essential attribute of
78
the exercise of its jurisdiction.

Where a justice court admitted certain incompetent testimony, the
county court reversed on appeal. On certiorari to the supreme court, it
was observed that under statutory certiorari the reviewing court has a
broader function to perform than in common-law certiorari, i.e., to "give
judgment as the right of the case may appear, without regarding technical
[omissions, imperfections or] defects . . . which do not affect the

merits. 2 79 The court noted that these meliorative provisions had been
largely overlooked in the past, but commented that "when substantial
justice had been done, not only the statute but the best interests of the
community require that their judgment should not be reversed for
defects purely technical." The court found other competent evidence to
support the action of the justice court and accordingly reversed the
county court. This case, and the statute it interpreted and applied so
liberally, achieved a worthy milestone in the progress of our law by
means of certiorari. It was the basis for the later rule allowing an administrative determination to stand notwithstanding the receipt of
incompetent evidence.
As ExCLUSIVE VEHICLE OF REvIEW
The office of certiorari as the special vehicle for challenging governmental action of a judicial nature was early established in an outstanding
XI. CERTIORARI

277. Noyes v. Hewitt, 18 Wend. 141, 145 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1837).
278. People ex rel. Seymour v. Canal Bd., 7 Lans. 220, 221 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872).
279. Bort v. Smith, 5 Barb. 283, 285 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849). See also People cx rel.
Mitchell v. Lawrence, 54 Barb. 589, 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1869).
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opinion, Mooers v. Smedley,8- 0 rendered by James Kent in 1822 in his
capacity as Chancellor. A county board of supervisors had voted to pay
a bounty of twenty dollars for each wolf killed. This was annulled at a
later special town meeting but defendant supervisors nevertheless prepared
to pay the bounty, which plaintiff claimed was an injury to him by way
of increasing his tax liability. He thereupon sought an injunction in
Chancery. Chancellor Kent, despite English precedents cited in Bacon
and Comyns to the contrary, ruled that "the review and correction of all
errors, mistakes, and abuses . . .in the official acts of public officers,
belongs to the Supreme Court."2 8' This laid down a rule of exclusive
certiorari jurisdiction over certain official action cognizable only in the
supreme court.
The rationale of Mooers v. Smedley was followed, though it was not
specifically cited, in an action for trespass brought against a turnpike
company for the taking of plaintiff's lands by irregular proceedings. 22
Plaintiff contended that only two appraisers had acted where three were
specified in the statute. The court replied that such a matter could not
be questioned collaterally and if the wrong procedure had been followed,
"it might have been set aside on certiorari."2 ' This ruling represented a
considerable break with long established English precedent which, prior
to the emergence of the prerogative writs, had found in the trespass
action a convenient method of securing review and recompense resulting
from questionable official action.
The rule set forth in Mooers v. Smedley received further clarification
and definition in a suit brought to recover a sum conceded to have been
illegally taxed against plaintiff. - 4 The court laid it down for a principle
that " 'when a magistrate or officer has jurisdiction of the subject-matter,
and errs only in the execution of his power, his acts are not void, but
voidable, and the only remedy is by certiorari,or writ of error,' ,.,*
and
the question would not be allowed to be opened in a collateral suit. This
was a categorical pronouncement, arrogating to certiorari exclusive
jurisdiction for providing judicial review of administrative action of a
judicial nature.
The foregoing edict was fortified in a subsequent suit for an injunction
280.

6 Johns. Ch. R. 28 (N.Y. 1822).

281.

Id. at 31.

282. Van Steenbergh v. Bigelow, 3 Wend. 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829). See also Van
Wormer v. Mayor of Albany, 15 Wend. 262, 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836), aft'd, 18 Wend. 169
(N.Y.Ct. Err. 1837).
283. 3 Wend. at 48.
284.

Swift v. City of Poughkeepsie, 37 N.Y. 511 (1868).

285.
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decided by the court of appeals shortly afterwards, involving highway
commissioners who had held a hearing and decided that plaintiff's fence
encroached upon a highway."' The lower courts had sustained defendants'
demurrer that the court had no jurisdiction in equity over the action. The
court of appeals affirmed, ruling that:
This very matter has been once tried by a tribunal created by statute for the express
purpose of trying and determining the matter; and the only redress, in such a proceeding for errors in law, is by a common law certiorari. The determination of
this statute tribunal is conclusive upon the facts, and the only review is upon a
common law certiorari, which will require the courts to examine into the proceedings . . . . The object of the law is to give such tribunals final powers over the
merits, upon this light class of litigation, which is confided to them. 28 7

In ruling out resort to other remedies, the court reinforced prior
holdings that the avenue of reviewing official action of a judicial nature,
not otherwise prescribed by statute, was now exclusively by certiorari,
in order "to give such tribunals final powers over the merits .

. . ."

The

revitalized writ had been transformed, over the period of a century, from
a mechanical device into a meaningful, efficacious arm of justice, which
entitled certiorari to take its place as an equal partner with other
established branches of the law.
XII. CERTIORARI-SUMMARY
At the very beginning of New York State law the raw material of English
case precedents and legal authorities treating certiorari as a royal prerogative writ had to be mastered and then accommodated to the delegation
of government power to newly created official bodies such as turnpike
companies, highway commissioners, canal boards, school trustees and
local government units not otherwise controlled by law. These new bodies
were engaged in making important decisions affecting the property and
rights of individual citizens and, in default of any other legal remedy,
it fell to common-law certiorari to bring these otherwise uncontrolled
activities within the orbit of legality under the checkrein of the courts.
Although common-law certiorari was intended, in the absence of any
statutory provisions, to perform the same functions as an appeal does at
present, there was little established law to guide the courts in determining
the scope and basis of such judicial review. In the earliest stage of its
New York State history the writ issued to examine only the bare question
of jurisdiction, and the courts tended to treat the underlying issues of
jurisdiction in a most perfunctory manner at first. As precedents
286. Hyatt v. Bates, 40 N.Y. 164 (1869).
287. Id. at 166-67. But see Kennedy v. City of Troy, 77 N.Y. 493 (1879)
curiam).

(per
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multiplied from increased and varied litigation and jurists gained broader
perspective from the expanded demands placed upon the writ, formal
review of jurisdiction was successively extended to embrace inquiry into
the existence of facts deemed requisite by statute, to questions of law, to
questions of fairness and regularity in the procedure, and to review of
the evidence for competence and sufficiency. These liberalizing developments were largely indebted to the practices pursued in regard to statutory
certiorari, especially to justice court certiorari where the evidence below
was considered as part of the record on appeal in order to enable the
reviewing court to determine whether the lower tribunal had erred on the
merits.
Tremendous growth in population and commerce marked this period
and brought into existence a number of government enterprises and
public works projects which impinged upon individual rights and property. To afford some measure of judicial review by certiorari in regard
to these new conditions, the courts developed a tendency to generously
label some administrative actions as "judicial." Paradoxically, a similar
tendency in mandamus actions closed the avenue to judicial review
because judicial action was there equated with discretion which had
been ruled impervious to judicial inquiry by mandamus. The difficulties
which the courts encountered in establishing the nature, function and
scope of common-law certiorari to meet native conditions are illustrated
by the consistent citation of eighteenth-century English landmark decisions during the entire century covered by this study. The general uncertainty in certiorari law was also manifested by intermittent fluctuation
of decisional law whereby contradictory opinions issued from the courts,
each supported by respectable precedent. The confusion in the law explains why many of the leading cases of the mid-nineteenth century
traversed the entire history of New York certiorari; only by tracing the
progress of the law could the court ascertain and apply the prevailing
rule, or formulate a modification.
It is noteworthy that the greatest strides in broadening the application
of common-law certiorari were accomplished in those cases where the most
exhaustive examination of prior case law was essayed. It stands to the
credit of the courts that they increasingly viewed the office of certiorari in
terms of expansive concepts. But this was surprisingly accomplished without the aid of constitutional principles or concepts of due process. For
example, at the very beginning of recorded legal history in New York, the
supreme court rejected legislative proscription of judicial review by
disregarding the label of conclusiveness placed upon the administrative
action of common pleas by the legislature.
Just as mandamus gained substance and dimension in its ultimate

748
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development from having been applied extensively to the actions of
judicial tribunals, common-law certiorari was able to progress rapidly
towards maturity because several statutory procedures for appellate
review by certiorari, in operation from earliest times, provided guidance
for establishing common-law certiorari as a mechanism for review of administrative determinations. In the process, judicial procedures were
ultimately absorbed into the methodology of the writ of certiorari to
the extent that the Code of Civil Procedure in 1880 codified certiorari
practice as a form of appellate review.

